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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1970, all construction contracts executed by the
Navy have included the provision that the contractor provide
some form of Quality Assurance (QA) or Quality Control (QC)
.
This requirement has evolved during the period since 197
into the present Contractor Quality Control (CQC) program
prescribed by Clause 76 of the General Provisions of all
Navy construction contracts.
Quality assurance, the concept that a contractor should
be responsible for the quality of his work, was developed by
several writers in the post World War II era, and found a
comfortable niche in the military environment.
The reason that QA was so enthusiastically adopted by
the military is clear. During the period of the buildup and
involvement of the United States in World War II, military
construction output rose from .6% to 10% of all construction
in the nation [Ref. 1]. The war's end provided a return to
peace, but the need to maintain an adequate military posture
in the post war era made it necessary for the country to
support military development. The continued development of
the Armed Forces would naturally require sustained construc-
tion of new facilities, and the rehabilitation of existing
ones. Planned budget and personnel cuts, however, confronted
the Services following the War, and an environment developed
10

where continued construction emphasis would have to be
accomplished employing reduced administration funds and
fewer inspection forces.
Enter QA, a concept whereby the contractor is expected
to assure the customer that the quality of his finished pro-
duct meets the specifications of the contract. In theory at
least, QA should reduce the amount of administration and
inspection required to assure an acceptable product. It is
therefore easy to understand why the program found advocates
in the military services. As budgeted contract administration
and inspection dollars were reduced, the need for some sort
of positive counter-action correspondingly increased, and in
gradual measures a formal program of quality assurance was
developed. This program has, since the time of its inception,
been modified and expanded into its present form as Contractor
Quality Control.
CQC, however, has not been the expected panacea. A basic
distrust by military personnel of the contractor as a self-
inspector, coupled with abuses of the system by both the mil-
itary and the contractors, has led in many cases, not to the
intended program of mutual cooperation toward quality con-
struction, but rather toward skepticism and outright hostility.
Soon after the Navy's initiation of its CQC program, a
Navy Civil Engineer Corps officer, then LTJG Clay Dean, sens-
ing the potential problems CQC would bring, investigated the
effect of CQC on interested personnel. His results were
11

published as a postgraduate Master's Degree thesis at the
University of Colorado in 1974.
In the years since these findings were revealed, the
problems uncovered in the CQC program have not disappeared,
and in some cases, may have increased in intensity. The
purpose of this thesis is to examine the present opinions
and attitudes of personnel toward CQC, to compare those
opinions within the Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC) , and to ascertain the costs of continued incorpor-
ation of CQC into contract construction.
The primary method of investigation employed in this
thesis was an opinion survey circulated to the five Engineer-
ing Field Divisions (EFD's) located in the continental United
States. These were the Chesapeake Division (CHESDIV) in
Washington, D.C., the Northern Division (NORTHDIV) in Phila-
delphia, PA, the Atlantic Division (LANTDIV) in Norfolk, VA,
The Southern Division (SOUTHDIV) in Charleston, S.C., and the
Western Division (WESTDIV) in San Bruno, CA. Questionnaires
were also sent to twenty-three (23) construction field offices
across the country, to fifty-one (51) contractors familiar
with the CQC program, and to the CQC coordinator in NAVFAC.
12

II. CONTRACTOR QUALITY CONTROL
A. THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
That a contractor should in some measure be responsible
for the quality of his work is a principle that has almost
universally been adopted by the construction industry since
the end of World War II. However, the definition of quality
as applied to the construction industry, and the means by
which to evaluate it, have been illusive.
The dictionary defines "quality" as a distinguishing
characteristic, or a degree of excellence. For the purposes
of this paper, construction quality could be understood to
mean that construction which, when accomplished, is based on
the best possible design and specifications, the most effec-
tive use of owner and construction material and equipment
resources, and the most competent and efficient craftsmanship.
The adaptation of quality controls to construction has
been somewhat recent, having been originally applied only to
the manufacturing and supply processes. In recent years,
however, top management personnel of Architect and Engineering
(A&E) and construction contracting firms have also realized
the vital role of quality control in their operations [Ref. 2],
The reasons for this new awareness are many. John B.
Guernsey, a member of several committees of the American
Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) indicated that
13

increased consumerism is a major factor. By focusing atten-
tion on quality, consumers have made manufacturers conscious
of the reliability and durability of their goods. The ulti-
mate results from this focus on quality are benefits both to
the consumer in better quality goods, and to the manufacturer
in increased public prestige and product reputation [Refs.
3, 4]. Ross F. Miller, Senior Vice President of Northrup
Corporation, echoes this belief when he explained that in
the marketplace price is rapidly being replaced by value as
the ultimate determinant of sales [Ref. 5].
In addition to the consumer issue, the courts have also
recently been more demanding in their philosophy toward the
legal liability of manufacturers, designers, and contractors
as witnessed by a dramatic increase in suits, claims, and
fines against them [Ref. 2] . Couple these consumer and legal
pressures with both the increasing demand of the Government
and other major users of goods for the contractor to take an
active role in the quality picture, and the fact that foreign
competition is outselling U.S. firms in increasing numbers of
areas, and the result is enormous pressure on the contractor
to institute and enforce a workable program of quality control.
Not all the forces are external, however, since the very
nature of some industries, particularly in construction,
exerts a powerful push for change. There are no easy profits
to be made in construction unless the contractor is totally
prepared to meet all the contingencies, and has an organization
14

flexible enough to do so. Productivity in the construction
industry rises at an annual rate of less than 1% , far less
than in many others, yet at the same time the costs of wages
and materials are rising alarmingly. Recent data indicate
that low productivity wastes from 14% to 40% of every con-
struction dollar spent. In this environment, a contractor
simply cannot afford to be inefficient, and any program that
provides the contractor with better control of his operations
cannot help but improve his chances to succeed [Ref. 6].
In the private sector, where quality assurance is encour-
aged rather than required, the process by which a contractor
provides this service is not clear. Professor Glen E. Hayes,
Professor of Industrial Technology at California State Uni-
versity, proposed that firms revise their basic goals and
objectives to include specific corporate policy statements
establishing quality assurance as an essential element of
the firm's objectives. He stated:
If policy statements adequately reflect Quality objec-
tives, and if the information prescribed in policy
statements is correctly articulated into the design,
operating procedures, specifications and methods, and
if output is congruent with these procedures and spe-
cifications, the number of significant Quality problems
is reduced. *-
Other authors suggest a not-so-intensive practice whereby
the quality aspects of each product or contract are individu-
ally determined. This process, sometimes called "Quality
Evaluation," generates the quality requirements for the
intended finished product. Quality is examined as related
15

to each individual attribute of the product and the importance
of each attribute is defined. A decision is then made as to
the best quality level for each attribute. The ultimate ob-
jective of quality evaluation is the determination of the
best quality level for the finished product, one that balances
the customer's needs and expectations with price and cost
[Ref. 7] .
One alternative might be for organizations in the United
States to move in the direction of Japanese enterprise and
produce quality products by encouraging the development of
the human side of the organization and the firm as a medium
for employees to express creativity, achieve self-fulfillment,
attain recognition, and interact socially. This technique,
the "QC Circle," has helped lift Japan to its present status
as a major economic power [Ref. 7]
.
Whatever direction the firm or industry decides to take,
the importance of quality controls cannot be overemphasized,
and if the United States is to remain competitive in the
marketplace, momentum must shift away from corporate and
worker apathy toward an atmosphere of cooperation and quality
craftsmanship. As Mr. Miller put it:
Inferior quality is not, or need not be, a character-
istic of American-made products or services. High-level
management throughout American industry must appreciate
the importance of quality control as an integral part of
the design, engineering, and production process, a cri-
tical element in the manufacturing system that reflects
a firm's commitment to excellence and its thorough under-




"Crattsmanship. that cherished term rooted in our history, is now associated more often with
our overseas competition.''
[Ref. 5]
B. THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
The Armed Forces of the United States recognized early-on
the importance of quality assurance in the procurement pro-
cess, and in 1947 adopted the Armed Services Procurement Act
which defined the methods by which military contracting could
be accomplished. In 1954 the Department of Defense (DOD) , by
instruction 4155.6, asserted that contractors must be more
responsible for quality [Ref. 8]. The firmness of DOD '
s
commitment to quality assurance was demonstrated in 1956 when
the Procurement Act was incorporated into Title 10, Chapter
137 of the United States Code, thereby becoming law.
17

As further refinements to the military procurement pro-
cess, DOD, in 1957 and 1959, issued instructions 4155.8 and
4155.10 respectively as a means by which to govern the rela-
tionship between the contractor and the Government in pro-
curement of both complex equipment and systems and also the
routine supply items defined in military and federal specifi-
cations. These instructions set forth the contractor's
responsibilities as including the basic regulation of quality
through a "quality program," and also the means and extent
of testing to be performed in support of quality. The Govern-
ment was therein afforded responsibility for verifying the
effectiveness of the contractor's quality program and methods
[Ref. 8]. In 1961, the essence of these instructions became
law when the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR)
adopted clause 7-602.10 requiring the contractor to maintain
an inspection system adequate to ensure that the work per-
formed conforms to all contract requirements and to make
available to the Government records of all inspections made
in this regard [Ref. 9].
In 1966, the Army Corps of Engineers was the first of the
Armed Services to adopt a formal program of Contractor Quality
Control (CQC) . The Corps defined CQC as: "The systematic
application of the methods, inspection techniques, and testing
procedures required to assure that all of the materials, equip-
3
ment and workmanship conform to the contract requirements."
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While the Corps was in the process of reviewing and
revising its CQC program, the Navy, through NAVFAC, was
closely observing the Corps' results. The Navy had previ-
ously been tightly controlling the contractor in his actions
rather than encouraging his ingenuity and expertise. The
thrust of Navy contract administration was toward protecting
the Navy from contractor errors rather than providing the
Navy with the best overall finished product [Ref . 10] .
In March 197 0, the Navy instituted its own CQC program.
Bob Robertory of NAVFAC Chief Counsel's Office defined CQC
then and now as a system by which to make the contractor more
responsible for the quality of his own work. [Ref. 11]. The
COC Manual, published to set in writing the requirements of
the Navy's CQC program, lists some of the benefits of CQC as
better use of Government and contractor personnel, fewer
claims, contract cost savings, and fewer construction con-
flicts. The contractor is expected to achieve these benefits
through the use of better management techniques, more effi-
cient scheduling of manpower and material usage, and greater
overall control of the construction process.
One further event which helped motivate the Navy toward
full implementation of CQC was an audit in 1971 performed by
the Comptroller General of the United States. This audit
investigated the effectiveness of the Navy's and Army's
construction programs by comparing finished construction
with the original specifications. The report states that:
19

A number of military facilities accepted by the Govern-
ment as completed were not built in compliance with
contract requirements. As a result, the facilities
were not fully satisfactory for their intended purpose
and/or the Government had to spend additional time and
effort having deficiencies corrected. ^
The report recommended the improved enforcement of CQC,
better reports from Government inspectors, better training
for Government inspectors, inspections and evaluations of
field activities by Headquarters, and coordination of similar
Army and Navy construction problems toward common solutions.
In 1974, NAVFAC revised and reissued the CQC manual to
include productive suggestions and inputs from field divisions
and field offices based on their experience with CQC construc-
tion. The revised manual defined the requirements of CQC,
provided the scope of action of both the contractor and
Government with regard to reports, submittals, the CQC pain,
defective materials and workmanship, work stoppages, incompe-
tent CQC representatives, and the appraisal of contractor
performance [Ref . 11]
.
In 1978, the Armed Services renamed the ASPR the Defense
Acquisition Regulations (DAR) and retained the provisions for
CQC.
The first in-depth evaluation of the progress and effec-
tiveness of CQC as a means of Naval construction contract
execution was accomplished in 1974. Joseph Clay Dean, a Navy
Civil Engineer Corps (CEC) officer and a postgraduate student
at the University of Colorado, wrote an extensive and inter-
esting thesis on the attitudes of personnel toward the
20

CQC program. His research revealed definite trends in the
attitudes of the various parties involved in the administra-
tion of CQC [Ref . 10]
.
The Navy has had an additional six years since 1974 to
adapt to and practice CQC. It appears that CQC remains the
controversial and misunderstood program that was revealed in
the 1974 study, and little has been accomplished to sell the
program to Navy or contractor personnel. NAVFAC is presently
in the process of revising the CQC manual for the purpose of
clearing up any philosophical issues and refining the defin-
ition of key terms [Ref. 12]. According to NAVFAC's Chief
Counsel's Office, the CQC program is a viable one expected
to continue in the foreseeable future [Ref. 11]
.
The essence of present day CQC policy, as set forth in
Clause 76 of the General Provisions of all appropriate con-
struction contracts, is as follows:
1. The contractor will provide a quality control organ-
ization to perform all necessary inspections and tests on all
aspects of the contract.
2. The contractor will provide an independent quality
control representative on the work site at all times during
progress, with full authority to act to ensure compliance.
3. The contractor will submit a CQC plan to the Govern-
ment which includes the letter appointing the CQC representa-
tive and outlining his authority, defining the CQC organization
to be used, relating the qualifications and authority of all
21

persons involved in the CQC process, listing testing and
other organizations to be employed, defining submittal pro-
cedures, including an inspection schedule, and detailing the
procedures of the CQC organization.
4. The contractor will provide all preparatory, initial,
and follow-up inspections as required.
5. The contractor will meet with the contracting officer
prior to the beginning of construction to discuss CQC.
6. The contractor will submit daily CQC reports in a
format approved by the Government.
7. The contractor will submit all test results and
validate all submittals prior to submission.
22

III. DATA COLLECTION AND COLLATION
A. THE SURVEY
Appendix A contains a copy of the survey questionnaire
prepared in conjunction with this research. The intent of
the questionnaire was to question the attitudes of Navy
contracting personnel and to compare them with those of
contractors who have had CQC experience. In order to eval-
uate the changes that have occurred in the attitudes of those
persons dealing in the administration of CQC, many of the
questions included in the questionnaire were necessarily
similar to those of the Dean survey of 1974. In an effort
to attract the greatest number of responses, the format and
wording of Appendix A were designed to be both simple and
easy to understand. The same survey form was used to collect
the data from the Government workers and contractors.
The questionnaire was divided into three sections. The
objective of the first was to determine the position and CQC
experience of the respondent, the second to investigate the
attitudes of each respondent on various aspects of CQC, and
the third to obtain the views of the respondent regarding the
cost effectiveness of the CQC program in its present form.
Where non-CQC construction is referenced, it was intended to
denote any construction performed without the surveillance
of a contractor's CQC representative.
23

Survey forms were forwarded to the Construction Divisions
of each stateside EFD and to a combination of twenty-three
(23) large and small contract field offices. The coordinator
of NAVFAC's CQC program was interviewed by phone and his
responses were also included. Each EFD provided a list of
responsible contractors, having had previous CQC experience,
who were also asked to respond. A stratified survey was thus
designed for a population limited to persons within the NAVFAC
contract organization.
Response to the questionnaire is shown in Table I. Total
Navy-wide response, at sixty-six percent (66%) , was well in
excess of the thirty percent (30%) predicted by statistics
sources. Response by EFD varied from a high of ninety-seven
percent (97%) (LANTDIV) to a low of thirty-four percent (34%)
(CHESDIV) . Contractor response, at thirty-five percent (35%)
,
followed predictions. It should be noted that the response
rate was calculated by comparing the number of questionnaires
returned with the number sent. Since the size of most office
staffs was not known, the number of responses sent was in
some cases greater than the number of personnel available to
answer. The true response was therefore somewhat larger than
calculated.
The Dean survey was based on fifty- four (54) Navy and
forty-two (42) contractor responses. One hundred sixty (160)
Navy and thirty-six (3 6) contractor responses have been anal-













NAVFAC 1 1 100
CHESDIV Navy 32 11 34
CHESDIV Contractors 18 5 28
NORTHDIV Navy 50 32 64
NORTHDIV Contractors 20 7 35
LANTDIV Navy 46 45 97
LANTDIV Contractors 20 6 30
SOUTHDIV Navy 46 34 79
SOUTHDIV Contractors 20 5 25
WESTDIV Navy 67 37 55
WESTDIV Contractors 24 13 54
Total Navy 242 160 66
Total Contractors 102 36 35




Response to each question and statement is discussed in
this section. Raw responses were collected and tabulated
according to the EFD from which they were received. Indi-
vidual field office response is not shown since this would
violate the confidentiality of the survey. The response
tables provided with each answer analysis also include the
percentage of response to each portion of the answer. In
order to attach greater significance to the answers of those
persons having the most experience with CQC, raw responses
were also weighted using the process shown in Appendix B.
In order to test the validity of the weighting system selected,
sensitivity analyses, as detailed in Appendix B, were also
performed. Weighted results were used to calculate the re-
vised response percentages displayed in the figures accompany-
ing the response tables, and also to identify the individual
within each EFD receiving the highest weighted experience
score. Within each EFD ' s response, the answer of the highest
scoring individual is highlighted by an asterisk (*) . Navy
and contractor weighted responses are indicated by an "N" or
"C" in the vertical bars of each figure.
Analysis of the survey results was accomplished by observ-
ing and plotting the answers to each question, by then compar-
ing them between Government and contractor respondents, by
examining EFD response, and by examining the response of the
high scorers. It should be noted that the number of responses
26

received for each question or statement did not always match
the number of respondents since some of the questions were
answered more than once, and answers to other questions were
omitted.
The interpretations of the data provided by the survey
are solely the author's. Data analysis is at best an inexact
science, and other, equally valid, conclusions are possible.
Those conclusions included as a part of this research were
based in part on the write-in comments of respondents, in
part on a review of available literature, and in part on the
nature of the response received.
27

1. Section A, Question 1 - What is your present job title?
Table I shows the overall response to the survey ques-
tionnaire. The distribution of respondents is shown below in
Table II.
TABLE II
BREAKDOWN OF TOTAL RESPONSE BY JOB TITLE
CHESDIV NORTHDIV LANTDIV SOUTHDIV WESTDIV TOTAL Dean
Category Number Number Number Number Number Number g.o Survey
Resp. Resp. Resp. Resp. Resp. Resp. Number
ROICC 2 6 4 12 8 11
AROICC 6 2 12 7 3 35 22 21
Construction
Representative 17 25 7 11 60 38 11
EFD Area
Coordinator 5 5 3 6 3 22 14 7
Contract
Specialist 1 1 1 2 5 3
Other 8 2 7 9 26 16 4
Total Navy 12 32 45 34 37 160 54
CQC
Representative
3 3 3 1 5 15 42 11
CQC
Contractor
2 4 3 4 8 21 58 31
Total
Contractor
5 7 6 5 13 36 42
There are several differences between this and the
previous Dean research. First, the size of the responding
Navy population, at one hundred sixty (160) persons, is three
times as large; second, a much greater percentage of construc-
tion representatives and contract specialists responded; and
28

finally, the contractor portion, although approximately equal
in size, contains an almost equal percentage of CQC field
office and home office representatives. The responses pro-
vided and analyzed herein should therefore represent a much
broader overall view of CQC.
29

2. Section A, Question 2 - What is your rank (military/
civilian) or company position?
Table III provides the distribution of Navy personnel
by rank. No such breakdown was practical for the contractor
respondents since titles and positions vary according to
company structure. The "unknown" row indicates respondents
who answered the questionnaire but did not provide their rank
or GS rating.
The major difference between this survey and the
previous one in the ranking structure of the respondents was
found in the greater percentage of responses from field office
civilians. Civil Service input from Resident Officer in Charge
of Construction (ROICC) offices provided greater than 70% of
the civilian input. The military response was approximately
the same in both number and rank to the Dean survey , and came
totally from officers with present or recent Officer in Charge












0-5 4 12 3
0-4 8 24 10
0-3 15 44 7
0-2 4 12 6
































3. Section A, Questions 3 and 4 - How many CQC contracts
have you inspected, administered, or been awarded in the past
five years in the following ranges? How many non-CQC con-
tracts have you inspected, administered, or been awarded in
the past five years in the following ranges?
These two questions provided the basis for the calcu-
lation of the weight given to each respondent's answers.
Appendix B explains the weighting system employed in this




4. Section B, Question 1 - In general, who should be
responsible for the inspection of contract construction for
compliance with plans and specifications?
The response to question Bl is contained in Table IV.
In every case the majority of EFD respondents felt that the
Navy should be responsible for inspection to determine com-
pliance with plans and specifications. Reinforcing this
position was the fact that the highest scorer in every EFD
also preferred Navy responsibility, and that the majority of
contractors (51%) also agreed. Further, weighting of re-
sponses, as illustrated in Figure 1, increased the percentage
of both Navy and contractor preference from sixty- four percent
(64%) to sixty-seven percent (67%) and fifty-one percent (51%)
to fifty-three percent (53%) , respectively.
Previous research indicated a preference for shared
Navy-contractor responsibility [Ref . 10] , however, no per-
centages were available to indicate the degree of preference.
In the CQC process the on-going role of Navy inspec-
tion is often minimized or forgotten. In the view of NAVFAC,
many Navy personnel see CQC as an opportunity to slacken
contract surveillance while the contractor carries the burden
of construction compliance [Ref. 11] . The key to good in-
spection, as suggested by the Army Corps of Engineers (COE)
and advocated by NAVFAC is thorough familiarity with all the
provisions of the contract, including plans, specifications,
33

changes, and administrative policy [Ref. 13]. The apparent
shift in sentiment from shared to sole Navy responsibility
may indicate an awareness on the part of all personnel of
the need for greater involvement on the lowest levels of
construction management.
Considering the response in total, it is interesting
to note that twenty- four percent (24%) of the Navy respondents
prefer the contractor to accept compliance inspection respon-
sibility and eleven percent (11%) prefer the project designer
(A&E) . Contractors, on the other hand, adopted the more
cosmopolitan view that the A&E should have a greater stake
in the process - thirty-four percent (34%) - and only thir-
teen percent (13%) saw this primarily as the contractor's
role. The position of the designer in the CQC process has









NAVY DESIGNER CONTRACTOR OTHER TOTAL
1
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1* 50 U 1* bu U u 1 1
CHESDIV 9* 69 4 31 13 6
! NORTHDIV 23* 49 9 19 14 30 1 2 47 23
|
LANTDIV 41* 73 5 9 9 16 1 2 56 27
J
SOUTHDIV 32* 76 4 10 6 14 42 20
1 WESTDIV 25* 56 5 11 15 33 45 22























































































Figure 1. Weighted response to Question Bl,
35

5. Section B, Question 2 - In general, who should be
responsible for the progress inspection of contract construc-
tion?
Table V and Figure 2 display responses to question B2.
In every case, the majority of respondents and the highest EFD
scorer felt that the Navy should have primary responsibility
for progress inspection. Weighting increased this preference
from seventy-six percent (76%) to seventy-nine percent (79%)
for Navy respondents and from sixty percent (60%) to sixty-
three percent (63%) for contractors. Previous research indi-
cated the preference for shared inspection [Ref . 10]
.
A natural question that could be asked in regard to
the CQC program would be that, if the contractor is to be
responsible for the quality of his work, why inspect him at
all? Inspection of the contractor's inspection program is
very necessary however. In the construction process, where
the delivery of a finished contract can take a long period
of time, it would be foolish not to take advantage of the
opportunity for construction surveillance [Ref. 14]. The
broad-base support for Navy inspection of contract progress,
as demonstrated by the response to this question, reflected
the belief that the participants of the CQC program also
preferred that the Navy take advantage of this inspection
opportunity.
If the second and third choices of the respondents
were examined, an interesting development again occurred.
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The contractor again designated the role of the designer in
progress inspection as important (20%), while Navy respondents,
on the other hand, considered it a minimum one (6%) . Navy
respondents chose the contractor (17%) as the second most








NAVY DESIGNER CONTRACTOR OTHER TOTAL
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
1 CHESDIV 11 92 1 8 12 6
1 NORTHDIV 29 71 4 10 8 20 41 22
|
LANTDIV 41 82 9 18 50 27
I SOUTHDIV 31 84 1 3 5 14 37 20
I WESTDIV 29 64 6 13 9 20 1 2 45 24
























































































Figure 2. Weighted response to Question B2
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6. Section B, Question 3 - In general, who should be
responsible for the final (acceptance) inspection of contract
construction?
To an even greater extent than in the previous two
questions of Section B, the response received indicated the
strong belief that the Navy should be responsible for final
inspections. Table VI and Figure 3 apply. This particular
question was answered identically by more respondents than
any other question or statement in the survey questionnaire.
There are probably two reasons for this overwhelming response:
one legal, the other psychological.
First, there is the rule of " caveat emptor " (let the
buyer beware) which has a firm basis in law, and which there-
fore prompts the Navy to have a last hard look at the work
presented for acceptance [Ref. 14]. Second, once the facil-
ity has been completed, every individual involved in the
construction process, from the designer to the inspector, has
a personal stake in its quality. No one wishes to be called
onto the carpet after a contract has been accepted, to dis-
cuss preventable construction errors, or to be personally
connected with a contract that provides only marginal ful-
fillment of the customer's needs. The final inspection be-
comes, theoretically at least, the last chance for many




Weighting of the response increased the preference
for Navy responsibility from eighty percent (80%) to eighty-
one percent (81%) for Navy respondents, and from seventy-one
percent (71%) to seventy-five percent (75%) for contractors.
It is in the aspect of final inspection that the Navy
and contractors agree on the relative importance of the de-
signer 1 s and contractor's roles. Eleven percent (11%) of the
Navy respondents, and twenty-one percent (21%) of the contrac-
tors preferred the designer as the second choice. This may
reflect the fact that, while there is no established niche
for the designer to occupy in the construction portion of the









1 RESPONSIBILITY CENTER SELECTED
NAVY DESIGNER CONTRACTOR OTHER TOTAL
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER ^ NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. 1 EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC i U U 1 1
1 CHESDIV 11 lioo 11 6
NORTHDIV 31 66 9 19 7 15 47 24
LANTDIV 46
1
87 5 9 2 4 53 27
SOUTHDIV 34 94 1 3 1 3 36 18
WESTDIV 35 70 8 16 4 8 3 6 50 25
TOTAL 158 80 22 11 14 7 4 2 198
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
RESPONSIBILITY CENTER SELECTED
NAVY DESIGNER CONTRACTOR OTHEF TCTAL
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 5 100 5 12
NORTHDIV 5 45 4 36 2 18 11 26
LANTDIV 6 100 6 14
SOUTHDIV 3 50 3 50 6 14
WFSTniV n 7Q 2 id n n 1 7 i a. n























7. Section B, Statement 4a - The contractor should be
responsible for the quality of his work, and would provide
adequate self-inspection without the CQC contract provision.
The majority of all EFD respondents (55%) and all
highest scorers except one (SOUTHDIV) disagreed with this
statement, demonstrating the belief that, without CQC, the
contractor would not adequately inspect his own work. The
majority of contractors (63%) held the opposite view.
Several respondents noted that this statement seemed
in reality to relate to two issues, the first to whether the
contractor should be responsible for quality, the second to
his self-inspection without CQC. At the time of the initia-
tion of the survey questionnaire, the first point seemed
undebatable, indeed the current literature propounded almost
universally, that the contractor was responsible for the
quality of his work. Further, previous research demonstrated
a very strong tendency for both Navy (91%) and contractor
personnel (88%) to agree with this premise [Ref . 10] . The
thrust of this statement was therefore directed at whether
the contractor would adequately inspect himself if not required
to do so. Table VII and Figure 4 illustrate the response.
Weighting increased the percentage of both Navy and
contractor respondents disagreeing to fifty-six percent (56%)
and twenty- four percent (24%) , respectively. It would seem
that Navy personnel were suspicious of the contractor's ability
to adequately inspect himself, while contractors, on the other




KUfunsL EQUAL CONTRACTOR SELF--INSPECTION
NAVY RESPONSE
WITHOUT THE CQC PROVISION
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER \ NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RES P. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 4 44 2 22 1 11 2 22 9 6
NORTHDIV 16 52 4 13 7 23 4 13 31 19
LANTDIV 15 33 11 24 1 2 6 13 13 28 46 - 28
SOUTHDIV 15 44 1 3 4 12 14 41 34 21
JE5TPIY ., ... .15,... 7fi & 1 4 -> * in ->&. q 77 4? ?fi
TOTAL 66 40 24 15 3
,






































































































8. Section B, Statement 4b - CQC usually provides the
means for a smooth interface between the contractor and the
Navy.
Table VIII and Figure 5 show the reply to this state-
ment. In general, response was mixed with Navy respondents,
EFD's, and high scorers split evenly between agreement and
disagreement. However, since only eight percent (8%) of all
Navy respondents (including the NAVFAC high scorer) strongly
agree with the statement, it can be safely stated that the
overall opinion of CQC as a medium to develop a smooth Navy-
contractor relationship is not strong. This premise is
supported when contractor opinions are also examined, since
a strong majority of contractors (74%) do not feel CQC pro-
vides a smooth interface. Whether the dissatisfaction evi-
denced is related to CQC in general, or only to the Navy's
CQC program, cannot be determined from this survey. It should
be noted, however, that CQC as presently practiced can be
considered inadequate in this regard since, by not producing
a smooth interface, it apparently cannot meet its goal of
reducing conflicts.
This problem is not one that is unsolvable, however.
Many general comments from both Navy and contractor personnel
indicated that the CQC concept is a good one. As one company
president put it, "The CQC program is an effective way for a
public owner to buy an extra measure of supervision from
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a contractor. The extra degree of supervision can have a
great effect in assuring a quality end product for the
owner." It is in the application of CQC to the construction
process where problems were most often noted.
The task confronting the Navy, therefore, is to
improve the CQC program in those areas that will allow the
most efficient use of Navy and contractor resources by en-




RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4b SMOOTHER CONTRACTOR/NAVY INTERFACE
UNDER CQC THAN NON-CQC
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DTRAfSRFE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 10 2 20 1 10 6 60 10 6
NORTHDIV 8 26 7 23 13 42 3 10 31 20
LANTDIV 17 16 12 27 1 2 13 29 2 4 45
.
29
SOUTHDIV 8 24 12 36 1 3 11 33 1 3 33 21
WESTDIV 7__. 1Q 11 in 1 a 1 1 in «T 14 37 ?4
TOTAL 41 26 44 28 6 4 54 34 12 8 157
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGPFE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 3 60 1 20 1 20 5 14
NORTHDIV 2 29 2 29 1 14 2 29 7 19
LANTDIV 3 50 1 27 2 33 6 17
SOUTHDIV 2 40 3 60 5 14
WESTDIV 4 31 4 31 n n 1 a <1 31 i i *«






























9. Section B, Statement 4c - CQC usually reduces the
time necessary for submission of approved material cuts,
progress payment requests, correspondence, etc.
Response to the statement that CQC reduces the admin-
istrative aspects of a contract was mixed as evidenced by the
data displayed in Table IX and Figure 6. The only significant
tendency was found in SOUTHDIV responses, where a strong
majority of respondents (63%) disagreed. In all other EFD '
s
a slight majority of respondents agreed. The indications
are, therefore, that a small majority of Navy personnel do
indeed perceive a time savings resulting from CQC contracting.
Interestingly, most contractors sided with SOUTHDIV
on this issue, with sixty-three percent (63%) disagreeing.
Contractor disagreement was consistent throughout the EFD's.
Contractor dissatisfaction with this aspect of the
program, as demonstrated through the survey results, probably
stems more from the frustration in dealing with Government
rules, regulations, and report requirements than from any
other source. The Government's proclivity for documents and
chronicles is well established, and can certainly seem exces-
sive to the average contractor. Usually not considered,
however, are the potential cost savings and benefits that
can be derived from an accurate and complete reporting system.
Not only can Government reports be properly prepared, but also
tax payments can be justified, losing cost centers can be
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recognized, and areas where bid price estimates were inaccurate
can be identified. Proper financial and other record keeping
can therefore benefit the contractor if he is sharp enough to
recognize its advantages [Ref . 13]
.
Previous research obtained similar results on the
Navy side, showing a fifty-seven percent (57%) agreement with
the statement [Dean, 1974]. Contractors, however, also agreed
with the statement in the previous research (68%) . Six years
of additional CQC experience seems to have shifted contractor









STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DTSAGREH
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD PESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 11 1 11 1 11 4 44 2 22 9 6
NORTHDIV 7 22 5 16 2 6 11 34 7 22 32 21
LANTDIV 8 17 9 20 4 9 18 39 7 15 46 29
SOUTHDIV 6 18 15 45 2 6 7 21 3 9 33 21
WESTDIV 7 ?n 4 1 ? 1 ? 1? " 10 20 IS 77
TOTAL 29 19 34 22 10
,




STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DI SAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER \ NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP . EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 4 80 1 20 5 4
NORTHDIV 2 25 2 25 1 13 1 13 2 25 8 22
LANTDIV 3 50 1 27 1 27 1 27 6 16
SOUTHDIV 1 20 2 40 1 20 1 20 5 4
WESTDIV 1 v\ 4 Ti n 1 8 « 38 1 T 1=,































10. Section B, Statement 4d - CQC provides adequate
flexibility to the contractor to control his job progress and
allows the contractor to recognize potential problems sooner
than non-CQC.
Response to this statement is displayed in Table X
and Figure 7. There is a strong similarity between this and
the previous statement. A small majority of Navy respondents
(51%) agreed that CQC does provide flexibility to the contrac-
tor; however, both SOUTHDIV and the majority of contractors
disagree at a rate of sixty-one percent (61%)
.
The reason for the contractor's lack of agreement
with this and the previous statement may lie in what appears
to many contractors to be the major contradiction of the CQC
program. As one company president explains it, a contractor
who wishes to fulfill the requirements of CQC will exhaust
considerable effort selecting a competent CQC representative
and developing a CQC system that is acceptable to the Navy.
The Navy, however, retains total approval authority on all
aspects of construction. The contractor, through the CQC
representative, can develop adequate, good-faith decisions
about material, equipment, or construction methods, only to
have them overturned by the Navy, often with insufficient
justification. The environment that develops, therefore, is
one where the contractor makes construction choices based on
the perceived reactions of the Navy rather than on the real
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demands of the contract: inefficiency and frustration
ultimately evolves.
A second possible reason for the contractor's disa-
greement may lie in the chain of command forced on the con-
tractor by the CQC program. Under CQC, quality is controlled
by the CQC representative, and production is the responsibility
of the job superintendent. The two positions, however, if
they do not work together closely enough, will develop a
definite jobsite conflict since the one is pushing for the
expeditious (and profitable) earliest completion of the con-
tract, while the other is often promoting delays in the con-
struction process to enable the Navy to inspect and accept
work in place before it is covered in order to avoid rework.
A shift for the worse in contractor attitudes has
evidently occurred since the previous survey since past re-
sponse indicated that the majority of contractors agreed that
CQC provided flexibility [Ref. 10].
From the responses received, therefore, it appears
that Navy respondents perceive the CQC program to provide
flexibility and foresight to the contractor, while contrac-
tors, on the other hand, do not receive the reinforcement
that should be forthcoming in these areas. Since the dissat-
isfaction has increased, the Navy may be well-advised to re-
evaluate the real responsibilities given to the CQC contractor
in an effort to provide a program where the contractor can be





JrESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4d GREATER CONTRACTOR JOB FLEXIBILITY
UNDER CQC THAN NON-CQC
NAVY RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONCLY TOTAL




NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 10 1 10 1 10 4 40 3 30 10 6
NORTHDIV 7 23 4 13 14 45 6 19 31 20
LANTDIV 9 20 10 22 3 7 13 29 10 22 45 29
SOUTHDIV 9 26 12 35 4 12 4 12 5 15 34 22
WESTDTV
, 7 19 7 l q \ a n 26 f 17 36 ->i
TOTAL 33 21 34 22 11 7 48 31 31 20 157
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 4 30 1 20 5 14
NORTHDIV 3 43 1 14 1 14 2 29 7 19
LANTDIV 1 27 2 33 2 33 1 27 6 17
SOUTHDIV 1 20 3 60 1 20 5 14
WESTDIV 3 23 3 21 n n * *a -> l «? 1 3 7K


















STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
ANSWER SELECTED
Figure 7. Response to Statement B4d,
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11. Section B, Statement 4e - CQC contracts experience
more problems or delays than non-CQC.
Although the response to this statement from the
highest scoring individuals was evenly distributed, the
general trend throughout the Navy, within each EFD, and among
contractors, indicated disagreement. Table XI and Figure 8
illustrate. Although only fifty-one percent (51%) of the
Navy response showed disagreement, twenty- four percent (24%)
had no opinion, while the remaining twenty-four percent (24%)
agreed. Weighted, the response is even more heavily in favor
of disagreement (55%) . Weighted, contractor response also
increased in favor of disagreement (54% to 58%)
.
There are two possible explanations for this response.
First, the large percentage of respondents choosing no opinion
on this issue could indicate either a lack of comparative
experience between CQC and non-CQC contracts, or the possi-
bility that a "no opinion" answer to this statement repre-
sented the choice that problems and delays on the two types
of construction were perceived to be about the same. Second,
since only about ten percent (10%) of the response indicated
strong agreement, the real possibility exists that CQC is
indeed more problem-free than non-CQC construction.
The two possibilities are therefore reduced to a
choice between an equal degree of problems and delays or CQC
being the least problem-prone, with the evidence indicating
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the latter. If the data are interpreted correctly, CQC does
fulfill its goal of reducing the number of problems encoun-
tered in the construction of Navy facilities.
Improvement is possible, however, and one area where
a reevaluation of procedures could be performed is in the
lattitude given by the Navy to the contractor in his inter-
pretation of the contract plans and specifications. As one
CQC company vice-president explained, design is usually
accomplished by an independent Architect and Engineer (de-
signer) , with review by the Navy, both within the EFD and
also at the customer level. It is so cumbersome to try to
arrange a change in the construction process that many field
offices and EFD ' s have adopted the unyielding attitude of
"do it by the specs" without regard for the benefits of the
proposed change. Contractors, therefore, may have become
reluctant to suggest improved construction methods or mater-
ials, and both innovation and quality therefore suffer.
54

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4e
TABLE XI




STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 3 30 2 20 3 30 2 20 10 6
NOPTHDIV 10 32 11 35 4 13 2 6 4 13 31 20
LANTDIV 7 16 11 24 14 31 10 22 3 7 45 29
SOUTHDIV 5 15 10 30 9 27 7 21 2 6 33 21
WESTDIV 7 19 13 3 6 R 77 T, R * 1 4 36 23
TOTAL 33 21 47 30 38 24 24 15 14 9 156
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DI SAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP . EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 1 20 1 20 2 40 1 20 5 14
NORTHDIV 3 43 2 29 2 29 7 19
LANTDIV 4 66 2 33 6 17
SOUTHDIV 2 40 2 40 1 20 5 14
WESTDIV 6 46 3 2.1 1 R n n 3 23 13 36






























12. Section B, Statement 4f - The finished product under
CQC is better than under non-CQC.
Table XII and Figure 9 display the response to this
statement. Fifty-three percent (53%) of the Navy respondents
and forty-six percent (46%) of the contractors (both majorities)
disagree that the finished product under CQC is superior to
that of non-CQC. Of the five high scorers voicing an opinion,
three disagreed. The NAVFAC response, however, was strong
agreement. In a manner similar to the response to the pre-
vious statement, a large percentage of the respondents (23%
Navy and 22% contractor) had no opinion. Since only twenty-
five percent (25%) of the Navy response and thirty-one percent
(31%) of the contractor response indicated any amount of agree-
ment, it can safely be surmised that CQC construction is
perceived no better than non-CQC considering only the finished
product. This premise is supported in the weighting where
both Navy and contractors increased in disagreement. Previous
research indicated a strong preference within the Navy for
Navy- inspected non-CQC contracting (83%) [Ref. 10].
The reasons that CQC is not perceived to provide better
finished quality than non-CQC are many. From the Navy's view-
point, the choice is between contractor inspection under CQC
and Navy inspection under non-CQC. Certainly the Navy re-
spondent may view the finished product resulting from his own
efforts in a different light than the finished product pre-
sented by the contractor. Additionally, it should be noted
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that most contracts in excess of one million dollars have
been awarded under CQC. Respondent comparisons of CQC and
non-CQC construction were therefore made based on two differ-
ent construction scales of effort. On the other side of the
coin, under non-CQC conditions, the Navy exerts a much greater
control over the construction effort, and the Navy response
provided herein may indeed reflect the view that quality
increases proportionally to the amount of owner control
exerted.
From the contractor's point of view, the choice is
similar. By allowing that quality is better under CQC con-
ditions, the contractor admits that quality is less in other
cases. Certainly no self-respecting contractor will willingly
admit that the ever-present Navy inspector is essential to
his providing quality work.
The conclusion would seem to be that the most that
can be expected of CQC construction is quality equal to that
of non-CQC. Allowing that the Navy can provide an acceptable
finished product using its own inspection forces, this con-
clusion is probably not unreasonable.
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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4f
TABLE XII




STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. F.FD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 10 1 10 4 40 4 40 10 6
NORTHDIV 5 16 7 23 7 23 10 32 2 6 31 20
LANTDIV 20 44 9 20 8 18 4 9 4 9 45 29




i q i n 2fl o ?=; fi 1 7 4 1 7 1*5 ?-»
TOTAL 50 32 32 21 36
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STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION
AGREE AGREE
ANSWER SELECTED







13. Section B, Statement 4g - There is a conflict of
interest inherent to CQC since the contractor inspects himself.
Eighty-four percent (84%) of the Navy respondents
and sixty-six percent (66%) of the contractors agreed that CQC
produces an inherent conflict of interest. Four of the five
high scorers also agreed, although NAVFAC strongly disagreed.
Belief that there is a conflict of interest has increased
significantly; previous research indicated only fifty-nine
percent (59%) agreement from the Navy and fifteen percent (15%)
agreement from the contractors [Ref . 10] . Weighting did not
change the response percentages.
The strength of the response is evidenced not only
by the results shown in Table XIII and Figure 10, but also in
the number and intensity of respondent comments written con-
cerning this topic. One SOUTHDIV ROICC summed up the general
feelings when he wrote, "No man can serve two masters." Since
the CQC representative is hired, paid, and fired by the con-
tractor, the only logical recipient of his loyalty is the
contractor. Many respondents, contractors among them, felt
it unsophisticated for the Navy to expect the CQC representa-
tive to side with the Navy on a quality issue, particularly if
the issue has a potential cost to the contractor.
The president of one CHESDIV contracting firm voiced
a particularly strong view of the conflict of interest, and
went on to call CQC a joke, a waste of time and tax money, and
a typical example of non-essential Government paper work.
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Certainly the premise that CQC promotes a conflict
of interest is unavoidable. Rather than bemoaning this fact,
it would be wise to examine the ways in which this conflict
can be used to the Navy's advantage.
For the Navy, CQC is a fact of life, and according
to NAVFAC, CQC will continue to be the dominant form of con-
tracting for as long as can be foreseen. Therefore, it is in
the best interest of the Navy to ensure that the CQC represent-
ative and operating system provided by the contractor is the
one best able to provide quality. Forcing the contractor to
comply with the CQC provision, even to the point of having the
CQC representative removed from the contract, is the only real
course of action available to the Navy if it is to develop
credibility and make the best of the present environment [12]
.
If the Navy gets tough, contractors, recognizing the
resolve of the Navy to ensure CQC compliance, will no longer
submit unqualified personnel or inadequate quality systems
for approval, and the Navy will realize the benefit of working
in the best possible CQC environment. The use of CQC as a
medium to ensure quality rather than as a fulfillment of a
Government requirement may therefore result.
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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT 34g
TABLE XIII
CQC CONFLICT OF INTEREST
NAVY RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGPEE DISAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
MAVKAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 2 22 1 11 1 11 5 56 9 5
NORTHDIV 2 10 4 20 11 55 14 70 31 20
LANTDIV 1 2 2 4 8 18 34 76 45 29
SOUTHDIV 3 9 2 6 6 18 22 67 33 21
WESTDIV 4.... T i 1 -? 7 5 1 1 7D 1 Q m 37 -)t
TOTAL 13 8 9 6 3
i
2 37 24 94 60 156
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD PESP
.
EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 1 20 2 40 2 40 5 14
NORTHDIV 1 14 2 29 4 57 7 19
LANTDIV 2 33 1 27 1 27 2 33 6 17
SOUTHDIV 2 40 2 40 1 20 5 14
WESTDIV 3 ?7 1 R 1 a 1 a 7 =^4 1 ^ Tfi




































14. Section B, Statement 4h - CQC representatives are
usually sufficiently qualified to perform the specified CQC
function.
Navy and contractor response, as evidenced by Table
XIV and Figure 11, was somewhat opposite regarding whether the
CQC representative is usually sufficiently qualified. Navy
respondents disagreed by fifty-nine percent (59%) while con-
tractors agreed by fifty-one percent (51%) . Four of six EFD
high scorers agreed with the Navy majority, however NAVFAC
and seventy percent (70%) of the CHESDIV response believed
that CQC representatives were usually qualified. Weighting
did not alter the results.
The reasons for Navy disagreement are many. One
LANTDIV Assistant Resident Officer in charge of construction
(AROICC) responded that most CQC representatives are under-
qualified and usually not sufficiently expert in enough areas
to realize quality mistakes. The fact that most CQC individ-
uals may not possess sufficient construction experience could
also manifest itself in a lack of forcefulness by the CQC
representative in his dealings with the contractor foremen
and craftsmen.
Another problem related to CQC qualifications is
found in the review of submittals. A SOUTHDIV Area Coordina-
tor explained that since the CQC representative was usually
not qualified to review all material cuts, extensive back-
checking was performed by the Navy for all CQC contracts.
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On many complex items SOUTHDIV has eliminated CQC review and
approval altogether.
Further complicating the issue is the fact that there
is no construction-wide demand for CQC individuals; therefore
finding an employee qualified to be a competent CQC representa-
tive is quite difficult. Since there is no demand for CQC
personnel, it follows that individuals working in this field
do not have sufficient influence to fully execute the CQC
function, nor do they have sufficient prestige to command the
wages incident to a reasonable job.
What are the qualifications of a competent CQC repre-
sentative? One contractor facetiously defined the character-
istics of a good CQC man as being blind, partially deaf, but
being able to type like hell. The true Quality Control pro-
fessional needs a myriad of talents, among them inquisitiveness,
writing skill, analytical ability, the ability to read and
interpret plans and specifications, and most of all, a basic
interest in producing a quality product [Ref. 15].
Since Navy construction is of a non-repetitive nature,
and since the qualities of a good CQC representative are mostly
unmeasurable, it may not be possible ever to reach the point
where each contract is accompanied by a detailed specification
defining the CQC representative acceptable to the Navy. How-
ever, efforts could be made to reduce the number of conflicts
resulting from the lack of qualifications on the part of the
CQC individual by closely examining the scope of each contract
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and specifying the minimum experience level acceptable for the
CQC. Using guidelines of this sort, the contractor should
submit for approval an individual who will be able to intelli-









STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 10 1 10 1 10 5 50 2 20 10 5
NORTHDIV 6 19 11 35 1 3 11 35 3 10 31 20
LANTOIV 17 38 11 24 2 4 13 29 2 4 45 29
SOUTIIDIV 7 21 13 39 1 3 11 33 1 3 33 21
WESTDIV 12 1? 1 T t=; ^ 14 6 16 1 1 37 OA
TOTAL 43 28 49 31 10
,
6 46 29 10 6 156
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STROl^JGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGRE] AGREE DISAGREE DISAGPF.E
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD PESP. EFD PESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 1 20 1 20 3 60 5 14
NORTHDIV 2 25 2 25 4 50 8 22
LANTDIV 1 27 1 27 4 66 6 16
SOUTHDIV 3 60 2 40 5 14
WESTDIV 5 33 1 8 1 8 4 11 2 IS 13 35
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15. Section B, Statement 4i - CQC contracts are better
designed than non-CQC.
As the results displayed in Table XV and Figure 12
indicate, respondents tended to disagree that CQC and non-CQC
designs are different. Sixty-one percent (61%) of the Navy
response, seventy-four percent (74%) of the contractor response,
and all EFD high scorers except NAVFAC disagreed. Of signifi-
cance is the fact that thirty-one percent (31%) of the Navy
respondents and twenty percent (20%) of the contractor respond-
ents answered "no opinion" suggesting that there may be no
perceived difference in design between the two processes.
Weighting increased the contractor disagreement level to
seventy-nine percent (79%)
Design, as one WESTDIV AROICC stated, is a facet of
the CQC program that should not be forgotten, since it is the
one aspect of the construction process that directly and con-
tinually impacts on the effectiveness of the CQC system.
Design defines the nature of the project, CQC interprets the
design. A quality design will necessarily result in quality
completed construction since the better the design, the fewer
the problems the Navy and the contractor have to face.
If, as the survey indicates, design of CQC and non-
CQC contracts are performed equally, it may be profitable for
the Navy to examine the design process as it directly impacts




There is much literature available that supports the
premise that whatever is done to improve the quality of the
design will result in cost savings and other benefits for the
owner. Although it may sound a little facetious, the institu-
tion of a workable Design Quality Control (DQC) system at each
EFD and NAVFAC would accomplish this purpose, and the savings
effected from the resulting reduction of change orders and









STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %

























































TOTAL 79 50 18 11 48
.




STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGPEE DISAGREE DISAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER ft NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP . EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 3 60 2 40 5 14
NORTHDIV 2 29 1 14 3 43 1 14 7 20
LANTDIV 3 50 1 27 2 33 6 17
SOUTHDIV 3 60 1 20 1 20 5 14
WESTDIV 10 83 n n l i * 1 1 * n 1? 34


































16. Section B, Statement 4j - Contractors usually allow
the CQC representative free rein in performing his duties.
Response to this statement indicated that the Navy
and the contractors are opposed in their attitudes toward how
much responsibility the contractor allows the CQC representa-
tive. Seventy-nine percent (79%) of the Navy respondents and
five of the EFD high scorers disagreed while fifty-four percent
(54%) of the contractors and NAVFAC agreed. CHESDIV and
SOUTHDIV with ninety percent (90%) and ninety-four percent
(94%) disagreement were particularly strong-voiced in their
opinions. Weighting significantly reduced the amount of con-
tractor agreement to forty-two percent (42%) . Table XVI and
Figure 13 apply.
The reasons for this response were probably related
to the response given previously to statement 4g. regarding
the inherent conflict of interest in the CQC program. In order
to ensure profits, many contractors will resort to threats and
intimidation to motivate the CQC representative toward inaction
on quality problems. One of the most frustrating situations
facing the Navy can be found where a competent CQC is harassed
by his employer for being overzealous. Presently there are no
means for the Navy to protect and retain the effective CQC
individual.
Another reason for the Navy response is found in the
contractor's use of the CQC representative. Often, in order
to more fully utilize the CQC ' s time, the contractor will
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provide him additional collateral duties in line with company
management and not the CQC function. Another tact sometimes
taken by the contractor is to list clearly the duties of the
CQC representative on paper while in reality diluting his
actual authority to act.
By reducing the responsibilities of the CQC individual,
however, contractors are ignoring one of the most important
rules of business, that when an employee is responsible for
the success or failure of some aspect of an operation, he must
also be provided power or authority sufficient to accomplish
his goals. In construction this rule is doubly true since
work moves so fact that delay in action can be costly [Ref. 16].
Understanding that the CQC program is only as effective
as the weakest CQC representative, it therefore behooves the
Navy and the contractor to take action to strengthen the author-




RESPONSE TO STATEMENT 4Bj
CQC REPRESENTATIVES OPERATE FREELY
NAVY RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AG RE 9 AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 6 60 3 30 1 10 10 6
NORTHDIV 13 40 6 19 4 13 8 25 1 3 32 20
LANTDIV 28 62 11 24 5 11 1 2 45 28
SOUTHDIV 21 64 10 30 1 3 1 3 33 21
WESTDIV
,13. . 4fi Q ?*? S 14 4 11 2 6 37 01
TOTAL 85 54 39 25 10
.




STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER 9> NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RFSP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 1 20 2 40 2 50 5 14
NORTHDIV 1 14 1 14 3 43 2 29 7 19
LANTDIV 4 57 2 29 1 14 7 19
SOUTHDIV 1 20 2 40 2 40 5 14




































17. Section B, Statement 4k - A complete, usable CQC
plan is vital to the proper performance of CQC.
Eighty-three percent (83%) of the Navy respondents
including every high scorer agreed with the importance of a
usable CQC plan. Contractors also agreed, but at a rate of
fifty-eight percent (58%) . The strength of the response can
be seen in Table XVIII and Figure 14. Not only was the re-
sponse on the agreement side of the matrix, but the majority
of all respondents, regardless of EFD, and all five high
scorers indicated strong agreement. Weighting did not signif-
icantly alter the response.
Previous research evidenced fifty-two percent (52%)
Navy and fifty- seven percent (57%) contractor agreement with
the statement, indicating a general strengthening in the belief
that the CQC plan, when properly submitted and reviewed, can
be a valuable management tool [Ref . 10]
.
The reason that the CQC plan has been identified as
one of the most important features of the CQC program can be
examined. Clause 7 6 of the contract General Provisions spe-
cifically defines the plan and its contents. The requirements
of the plan are clearly a Management-by-Objectives product.
Each aspect of the CQC program has been defined and related
to a specific section of the CQC plan, thus making the CQC
plan, if properly prepared, an extensive document setting down
in writing the contractor's actions and responsibilities
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regarding CQC in its entirety. The plan thus becomes the
means for the contractor to show the Navy that his specific
intentions to provide a quality product, and for the Navy to




RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4k
TABLE XVII
USEFULNESS OF CQC PLAN
NAVY RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STPONGLY SLIGHT LY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AG PEE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD PESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHF.SDIV 1 10 2 20 7 70 10 6
NORTHDIV 3 9 2 6 7 22 20 63 32 20
LANTDIV 3 7 2 4 10 22 30 67 45 28
SOUTHDIV 3 9 2 6 1 3 5 15 22 67 33 21
WESTDIV 2. , fi 4 1 1 4 i 1 4 i i ?1 fi? T7 :>•*






























































































































18. Section B, Statement 41 - Navy personnel usually
understand the requirements of the CQC program.
Navy respondents agreed by sixty-seven percent (67%)
that Navy personnel understand CQC. Four of the six EFD high
scorers also noted agreement, and contractor response favored
the statement by fifty- three percent (53%) . Overall the
response throughout EFD's was consistent except that NORTHDIV
contractors disagreed at a rate of fifty-seven percent (57%) .
Table XVIII and Figure 15 apply.
A comparison with previous research indicated an
increase in the amount of agreement from both Navy and con-
tractor respondents, the Navy up from fifty-five percent (55%),
contractors up from forty-eight percent (4 8%) [Ref . 10]
.
Weighting did not change the response.
One of the most interesting results of this research
directly relates to this subject. In only nine (9) of twenty
(20) cases did the response of NAVFAC agree with the majority
of respondents, and in only twelve (12) cases did NAVFAC agree
with the majority of the EFD high scorers. It would therefore
seem that NAVFAC is isolated from the attitudes of the EFD.
In reality, however, the opposite is more likely the case.
Most field office personnel are prone to base an opinion or
attitude on very few career experiences with a limited number
of CQC problems. NAVFAC personnel, on the other hand, can
usually speak from a wide range of experience, and the fact
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that NAVFAC *s responses are generally those to be expected
from a strong proponent of CQC , is not unrealistic. At the
NAVFAC level, these attitudes and perceptions may be correct.
The problem demonstrated, however, is how to bridge
the gap between NAVFAC and the field; that is, how to provide
Navy-wide construction information to all parties in the CQC
process, how to demonstrate that CQC can work if properly
administered, and most important of all, how to make available
to all parties the methods that NAVFAC and the field offices
have employed to solve specific CQC problems.
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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B41
TABLE XVIII
NAVY UNDERSTANDING OF CQC REQUIREMENTS
NAVY RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AG PEE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER | % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP . EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD PESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
MAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 10 2 20 2 20 2 20 3 30 10 6
NORTHDIV 1 3 4 13 3 9 14 44 10 31 32 20
LANTDIV 5 11 9 20 17 38 14 31 45 28
SOUTHDIV 3 9 7 21 1 3 12 36 10 30 33 21
WESTDIV 6 16 6 16 * « 1 ^ ?4 in 9fi 7R OA
TOTAL 16 10 28 18 9 6 59 37 47 30 159
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGPEE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD PESP. EFD PESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 1 20 2 40 2 40 D 14
NORTHDIV 1 14 3 43 1 14 1 14 1 14 7 19
LANTDIV 1 17 5 83 6 17
SOUTHDIV 1 20 4 80 5 14
WESTDIV 2 15 4 31 1 a * ?? * ?1 1? ?fi

















STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION
AGREE AGREE
ANSWER SELECTED







19. Section B, Statement 4m - The qualifications of
the CQC representative should be specified in the contract.
Eighty-seven percent (87%.) of the Navy respondents,
including five of six EFD high scorers, and fifty-seven percent
(57%) of the contractors agreed that CQC qualifications should
be specified. Only NAVFAC disagreed. Response was consistent
throughout each EFD, as Table XIX and Figure 16 show.
Interestingly, previous research showed the Navy and
contractors in exact agreement at sixty-seven percent (67%)
indicating an increase in the Navy agreement level and a de-
crease in the contractor agreement level. Weighting reduced
the strength of the Navy agreement to eighty-five percent (8 5%)
and the contractor response also lessened (52%)
.
The response to this particular statement showed the
highest level of agreement to any attitude statement in the
questionnaire. The reasons given for the response were typi-
cally that the contractor usually provided anyone from a
journeyman craftsman to a newly-graduated engineer, to a
retired construction foreman to fill the CQC position. On
paper, justification could be made for any of these individuals
to be the CQC representative, yet the wide range of experience
and skill would indicate a vast difference in each one's poten-
tial attitude toward performance of CQC and of the CQC function,
Attempts to specify the exact qualifications of a
competent CQC are usually unrewarding. Some persons prefer an
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individual with extensive construction experience, while
others identify education and management expertise as the
prime skills. Still others favor the CQC meeting minimum
levels of competence in all aspects of the potential contract.
As identified by the analysis of statement 4h, however, there
is really only one attribute shared by all good quality control
individuals and that is the willingness to demand a quality
finished product.
Here again NAVFAC ' s response is enlightening. When
asked to comment on this issue, Paul Pleisance, NAVFAC ' s CQC
expert, identified the major problem in defining the qualifi-
cations of the CQC representative as a legal one. In essence,
previous court decisions have shown that, where the Government
has attempted to specify the qualifications of the contractor's
CQC representative, and accepted a specific individual who
meets these qualifications, removal of that individual for any
reason other than a most serious violation of the CQC program
has been almost impossible. NAVFAC has had good experience,
on the other hand, forcing the removal of marginally unsatis-
factory CQC's so long as the contractor retains the responsi-
bility for providing competent CQC personnel.
The situation again surfaces where valid reasons exist
for a NAVFAC policy, yet there is a perceived lack of action on
NAVFAC s part evident at the field level resulting from not
disseminating these reasons. Communication and education could
therefore be identified as the necessary, but often forgotten,




RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4m
BETTER CQC QUALIFICATIONS SPECIFICATIONS
NAVY RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGPEE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 10 3 30 6 60 10 6
NORTHDIV 2 6 1 3 9 28 20 63 32 20
LANTDIV 1 2 5 11 7 16 32 71 45 28
SOUTHDIV 3 9 2 6 6 18 22 67 33 21
WESTDIV f) n o fi 3 a * a ?q 7R T7 71
TOTAL 7 4 3 2 11 7 28 18 109 69 158
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE 4
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 1 20 1 20 2 40 1 20 5 14 '
NORTHDIV 3 43 1 14 2 28 1 14 7 19
LANTDIV 1 17 3 50 2 33 6 17
SOUTHDIV 1 20 1 20 1 20 2 40 5 14
WESTDIV n n * ?~{ 1 P. 1 ?T fi 46 n Tfi

















STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION
AGREE AGREE
ANSWER SELECTED







20. Section B, Statement 4n - There is less disapproved
work or rework on a CQC contract than on a non-CQC contract.
Table XX and Figure 17 show the response to this
statement. A majority of Navy respondents (50%) and contrac-
tors (59%) disagree; however, the response was mixed within
EFD's. CHESDIV and NORTHDIV favored agreement, while LANTDIV,
SOUTHDIV, and WESTDIV disagreed. On the contractor side, the
majority of all EFD's favored disagreement. There was also
a significant response in the "no opinion" category indicat-
ing that many respondents possibly consider the amount of
rework encountered on the two types of contracts to be about
the same. This point is borne out when the weighting is con-
sidered since the degree of Navy disagreement remained at
fifty percent (50%) while contractor disagreement dropped
slightly to fifty-eight percent (58%)
.
The reason for the Navy response probably stems from
the attitude that the contractor, not having a perceived stake
in the project other than the profit motive, will not put as
much time and effort into quality assurance as a full-time
Navy inspector. The perception is therefore that, while the
Navy is actively seeking to find and resolve problems before
they have an impact on the overall project, the CQC repre-
sentative will most often not find them until after they have
already occurred.
That the CQC program in itself generates additional
rework is a debatable issue. The Journal of the Construction
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Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers, in
reviewing various programs for Quality Control, found that
under CQC, as under other programs, unscrupulous or unsophis-
ticated contractors will use the available opportunity not to
fulfill specific contract requirements. The greatest problem
arises when the Government, in setting up the quality program,
includes a complicated, cumbersome system for the implementa-
tion of remedial action. If the remedial process is difficult
to handle or exceptionally time-consuming, the contractor is
encouraged to shortcut the quality process since the Government
may elect to accept less-than-specified construction rather
than employ the remedy. In order to alleviate this problem,
the Government, in manh cases, elects to inspect the contract
with the same intensity that a non-CQC contract is inspected,




RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4n
TABLE XX




STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD PESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 2 20 3 30 5 50 10 6
NORTHDIV 4 13 8 25 4 13 15 47 1 3 32 20
LANTDIV 17 38 11 24 4 9 9 20 4 9 45 28
SOUTHDIV 11 33 8 28 4 12 7 21 3 9 33 21
WESTDIV 7 i q in 71 S 1 4 V -?n 4 1 l ^7 7A




STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER 9; NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP . EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 2 40 2 40 1 20 5 14
NORTHDIV 3 43 1 14 1 14 2 28 7 19
LANTDIV 1 17 2 33 1 17 1 17 1 17 6 17
SOUTHDIV 1 20 4 80 5 14
WESTDIV 3 77 ? 1 "t 1 •31 4 *i i a 1 "* Tfi






















STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION
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21. Section B, Statement 4o - The Navy overinspects CQC
contracts.
The Navy disagrees that it overinspects CQC contracts,
The strength of this belief is illustrated by the fact that
forty percent (40%) of all Navy respondents and five of six
EFD high scorers indicated strong disagreement, while in
total, sixty-eight percent (68%) of all Navy respondents
disagreed. Response was consistent throughout EFD's, and
LANTDIV (80%) showed the highest disagreement level.
Contractors also indicated disagreement, but at the
lower rate of fifty-two percent (52%) . EFD response was mixed
for contractors with CHESDIV (80%), LANTDIV (83%), and WESTDIV
(54%) disagreeing, and NORTHDIV (56%) and SOUTHDIV (80%)
agreeing. Weighting reduced the overall Navy and contractor
disagreement to sixty-five percent (65%) and fifty percent
(50%) respectively. Table XXI and Figure 18 apply.
Why does the Navy feel that it does not overinspect
CQC contracts when in many cases the Navy inspector spends a
considerable amount of time observing the work in progress?
The reason can probably be found in the difference of the
focus of the work. On a non-CQC contract, the Navy inspector
must personally hammer out solutions to discrepancies with
the contractor's superintendent or foremen; the majority of
his time is therefore spent in on-site problem solving. On
a CQC contract, the inspector will still identify problems,
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but he can now require the CQC representative to list the
problem in the daily report. The contractor is then charged
with providing the solution from within his own organization.
As a result of the CQC process, much on-site inspection time
and many construction headaches are avoided by the Navy, but
overall, when the review of reports and problem solutions
from the contractor are included, the overall amount of in-
spector time expended on CQC contracts may be about the same.
A conscientious inspector may therefore provide the
same amount of time in administering the CQC contract as he
does in inspecting a non-CQC contract, and still exact the
same quality by manipulating the CQC representative in the
correct manner. If, on the other hand, he does not thoroughly
familiarize himself with the requirements of the contract, or
lets the contractor assume full responsibility for construc-
tion quality, problems can certainly arise. Without the
presence of the Navy inspector, and the assumed interest in




"»" at u NAVY OVERINSPECTION OF CQC
NAVY RESPONSE CONTRACTS
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGPEE AGREE DISAGR.EE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 3 30 3 30 1 10 3 30 10 6
NORTHDIV 14 44 5 16 4 13 5 16 4 13 32 20
LANTDIV 20 44 16 36 4 9 2 4 3 7 45 28
SOUTHDIV 14 42 8 24 2 6 8 24 1 3 33 21
WESTDIV a . . T3 1 7 ** 3 a Q " 4 1 1 77 ?7
TOTAL 60 40 45 28 14
,
9 27 17 12 7 158
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDIV 3 60 1 20 1 20 5 14
NORTHDIV 3 43 2 28 2 28 7 19
LANTDIV 5 83 1 17 6 17
SOUTHDIV 1 20 1 20 3 60 5 14
V.'ESTDIV
. ... 3. ?7 4 7] 1 a
•>
3 4 71 1 7 7fi
































22. Section B, Statement 4p - I prefer CQC to non-CQC
contracts
.
As Table XXII and Figure 19 show, the preference for
CQC contracts over non-CQC is mixed. The Navy responded with
forty-eight percent (48%) overall disagreement, but a sub-
stantial thirty-five percent (35%) as well as four of six
high scorers agreed. The "no opinion" category, with a seven-
teen percent (17%) response, probably indicated the magnitude
of the "equal preference" response. Within EFD's, response
varied with LANTDIV (54%) SOUTHDIV (61%), and WESTDIV (53%)
disagreeing, and CHESDIV (63%) and NORTHDIV (47%) agreeing.
Contractors also disagreed, but at a rate of sixty-nine per-
cent (69%) , and a similar mixed EFD response. Weighting
increased the percentage of disagreement to fifty-one percent
(51%) for the Navy, and seventy-two percent (72%) for con-
tractors.
Proponents of the CQC system of insuring construction
quality expound the benefits of transferring the liability for
quality assurance to the contractor, and also the reduced
costs resulting from less inspection time, and the contractor's
use of his construction management expertise [Ref. 17]. The
fact that these benefits are not readily evident may be the
result of the application of CQC on too small a scale. One
NORTHDIV Area Coordinator favored CQC, but only on contracts
in excess of $10 million dollars, explaining that above this
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figure the contractor can fully employ a CQC organization
and effect cost savings through economies of scale.
Opponents of CQC cite the continued need for Navy
inspection, conflicts between the CQC representative and the
project superintendent, and the lack of Navy control over
the construction process as major disadvantages. As has
been previously pointed out, dissatisfaction with CQC stems,
not from the use of the contractor as an instrument for
quality control, but rather in the methods used to effect
the quality. Procedures, and not the basic philosophy, have
therefore apparently held back acceptance of the CQC program.

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4p
NAVY RESPONSE
TABLE XXII
PREFERENCE FOR CQC OVER NON-CQC
CONTRACTS
ANSWER SELECTED
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER i NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 9 1 9 2 18 4 36 3 27 11 7
NORTHDIV 6 19 4 13 7 22 8 25 7 22 32 20
LANTDIV 17 38 7 16 8 18 9 20 4 9 45 28
SOUTHDIV 17 52 3 9 6 18 3 9 4 12 33 21
WESTDIV 10 26 11 29 4 11 S 13 8 21 38 24
TOTAL 51 32 26 16 27 17 29 18 27 17 160
CONTRACTOR RESPONSE
ANSWER SELECTED
STPONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP . EFD RESP. EFD RESP . EFD RESP. TOTAL
CHESDCV 4 80 1 20 5 14
NORTHDIV 4 57 1 14 1 14 1 14 7 19
LANTDIV 2 33 1 17 3 50 6 17
SOUTHDIV 3 60 1 20 1 20 5 14
WESTDTV 8 62 1 8 1 8 3 23 o 13 36





















STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OriNION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGRFE
ANSWER SELECTED
Figure 19. Response to Statement B4p.
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23. Section B, Statement 4q - In general, costs are
reduced under CQC.
The general opinion of respondents was to disagree
that costs are reduced under CQC contracting. Sixty-nine
percent (69%) of the Navy response, including four of five
EFD high scorers, disagreed. NAVFAC strongly agreed. Among
EFD's response was consistent except that CHESDIV disagreed
only at a rate of thirty percent (30%)
.
Contractor disagreement was stronger still with an
eighty percent (80%) disagreement level. All contractor
response within EFD's favored disagreement. Weighting re-
duced Navy disagreement to sixty percent (60%), but raised
contractor disagreement to eighty-two percent (82%) . Table
XXIII and Figure 20 apply. It would appear, therefore, that
neither the Navy nor the contractors perceive that CQC reduces
costs, despite cost savings being one of the touted benefits.
CQC should theoretically provide a double cost sav-
ings. The Government should benefit from a reduction in
inspection effort, and also from an increase in the quality
of the contractor's bidding on large Government jobs. The
contractor's cost savings should result from his use of good
management techniques, and the ability to drop bid contingen-
cies since the CQC program should be identically managed
throughout the owner organization.
The October 1978 issue of Industrial Engineer noted
that Allis-Chalmers Corporation had made an additional $7 5
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dollars in earnings that could be directly related to quality
assurance measures. It is savings of this sort that the Navy
had in mind when the CQC program was implemented: savings
that are perceived not to have materialized [Ref. 18].
One reason cited by several Navy respondents for the
lack of financial success of the CQC process is the status
of the CQC representative. The program, in order to be suc-
cessful, should produce a CQC representative with the best
possible construction and management skills. In order to
cut costs, contractors will usually submit for approval an
individual with the minimum skill level the Navy will accept.
This practice seriously dilutes the potential of CQC, and
results in no construction cost savings for the contractor.
This same practice also reduces the cost savings for the Navy
since a less competent CQC representative will induce a greater
amount of on-site Navy inspection.
Contractors in general cited one main reason for this
lack of cost savings. Under CQC, the contractor is required
to review and approve shop drawings and submittals, yet the
Navy and the designer also provide the same review. By dupli-
cating the review process, the anticipated time and cost sav-
ings to the contractor resulting from his approval of submittals
has not materialized.
The only positive comment from a contractor relating
to cost savings came from a NORTHDIV construction company
president who stated that the major benefit of CQC, on large
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jobs, is that the contractor, by controlling his effort, may
be able to reduce construction time by ten to thirty percent,
Whether CQC reduces construction time on large projects was
not the subject of this research, however, and no other









STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGJ>E£
NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
NAVFAC U U U 1 1 1
CHESDIV 1 10 2 20 5 50 2 20 10 6
NOPTHDIV 11 34 8 25 9 28 4 13 32 21
LANTDIV 26 58 11 24 1 2 5 11 2 4 45 29
SOUTHDIV 19 59 8 25 3 9 1 3 1 3 32 21
WESTDIV is 42 7 19 7 19 2 fi 5 14 36 23


















































































































24. Section B, Statement 4r - The contractor would hire
the CQC individual in a similar function under non-CQC
conditions.
Table XXIV and Figure 21 show the response to this
statement. In general, Navy respondents strongly disagreed
that the contractor would provide his own CQC representative
if the Navy did not require one. Fifty-seven percent (57%)
of Navy respondents, and four of five EFD high scorers
answered in the "strongly disagree" category. In total,
seventy-six percent (76%) of the Navy respondents disagreed,
CHESDIV being the only EFD not to disagree.
Contractors also disagreed strongly, with a fifty-
three percent (53%) response in that category and a seventy-
seven percent (77%) total disagreement. Of contractor
response within EFD's, only LANTDIV did not follow the
majority. Weighting slightly reduced Navy disagreement to
seventy-five percent (75%) and increased contractor disagree-
ment to eighty percent (80%)
.
By relating this response to the earlier conclusion
that the contractor is not perceived to be willing to provide
adequate quality control unless forced to do so, it is appar-
ent that, without the CQC provision, the only party directly
concerned with quality would be the Navy by its vested interest.
But perhaps this perception is not necessarily cor-
rect. One contractor suggested that, even without the CQC
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representative, most contractors would still provide a quality
finished product. The reason for this assertion was that
since most customer organizations do not now require a formal
CQC program but do require quality construction, the standard
contractor organization is set up to ensure quality on the
production level. The contractor, therefore, does indeed
emphasize quality, but not on the formal scale required by
the CQC program, and while the CQC representative would not
be retained under non-CQC conditions, the CQC function would
still exist in the operating forces.
95

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT B4r
NAVY RESPONSE
TABLE XXIV
CONTRACTOR USE OF CQC INDIVIDUAL
UNDER NON-CQC CONDITIONS
ANSWER SELECTED
STPONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY TOTAL
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
NUMBER % NUMBEP % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER % NUMBER %
ACTIVITY PES P. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. EFD RESP. TOTAL
MAVFAC 1 1 1
CHESDIV 3 30 2 20 1 10 4 40 10
NORTHDIV 23 70 5 15 2 6 2 6 1 3 33
LANTDIV 23 51 8 18 5 11 6 13 3 7 45
SOUTHDIV 15 47 6 19 4 13 6 19 1 3 32
WESTDIV 25 fia 9 24 1 * 1 ? 1 3 37
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N r*-H c I
STRONGLY SLIGHTLY NO OPINION SLIGHTLY STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
ANSWER SELECTED
Figure 21. Response to Statement B4r.
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25. Section C, Question 1 - What are the approximate
pay scales of a CQC representative in the ranges : less than
$1 million, $1 million to $5 million, and greater than $5
million?
Tables XXV and XXVI display the response to this
question from Navy and contractor respondents. The purpose
of the question was to compare what the Navy and the contrac-
tors perceive the monthly salary of the CQC representative
to be.
It is easily seen, from a comparison of the tables,
that in general the Navy perceived the salary of the CQC
representative to be less than the contractors actually paid.
On contracts less than $1 million, the Navy average answer
was $1530 per month while the contractor indicated $1625 per
month; on contracts in the ranges from $1 million to $5 mil-
lion the Navy average answer was $1693 per month compared to
the contractor's $1910 per month; and on contracts greater
than $5 million the Navy answered $2063 per month and the
contractor $2114 per month.
The reason for the Navy's underestimation of CQC
salary may lie in the fact that, in general, Navy response
to the attitude portion of the survey indicated a definite
belief that CQC does not fulfill its purpose. By responding
in ranges less than the actual amount paid, the Navy may have
voiced an opinion on the worth of the CQC representative and




NAVY RESPONSE TO CQC REPRESENTATIVE SALARY RANGES
ACTIVITY
Contracts Less than $1 Million






















Contracts from $1 Million to $5 Mi.11 ion
NAVFAC 1 1667
CHESDIV 4 2083 1700 1896
NORTHDIV 22 2800 1000 1587
LANTDIV 27 2500 1000 1648
SOUTHDIV 27 2200 1000 1548
WESTDIV 23 3500 1000 2315
TOTAL 104 1693
Contracts Greater than $5 Million
NAVFAC 1 2083
CHESDIV 3 2000 1700 1900
NORTHDIV 19 2800 1200 1601
LANTDIV 18 3500 1000 2260
SOUTHDIV 26 3000 1000 1924





CONTRACTOR RESPONSE TO CQC REPRESENTATIVE
SALARY RANGES
Contracts Less than $1 Million






















Contracts from $1 Mill ion to $5 Million
CHESDIV 3 2700 2000 2333
NORTHDIV 6 2000 1100 1457
LANTDIV 5 3000 1200 2100
SOUTHDIV 5 2500 1680 1756
WESTDIV 9 2700 1400 2050
TOTAL 28 1910
Contracts Greater than $5 Million
CHESDIV 2 3000 2000 2500
NORTHDIV 3 2000 1200 1500
LANTDIV 3 3000 1600 2300
SOUTHDIV 3 2000 1200 1633




26. Section C, Question 2 - What are the approximate
pay scales of a Navy construction representative assigned to
inspect construction in the ranges less than $1 million, $1
million to $5 million, and greater than $5 million?
Table XXVII displays the Navy response to this
question. Insufficient contractor response was received to
develop a contractor-response table; the most common reason
cited for the lack of contractor response was the non-avail-
ability of information. It is interesting to note that while
a great many Navy respondents estimated the salary of the CQC
representative, very few contractors estimated the Navy in-
spector's salary. No comparison of Navy and contractor per-
ceptions could therefore be made.
Despite the lack of comparative information in this
response, it was still possible to compare the Navy's answers
to this question with those of the preceding question. In
every case, the average Navy inspector salary was less than
the average perceived CQC representative salary, which in
turn was less than the contractor's actual CQC salary. The
reason for this difference may be that, in the opinion of
most Navy personnel, the typical inspector, like other civil
servants, is not paid commensurate with the difficulty of the
work for which he is responsible. The CQC representative,
who has much less perceived responsibility-than the Navy
inspector, reaps the benefits of the contractor's profits.
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The perception existed, therefore, that no matter how little
the CQC representative is paid, and how little he accomplishes,
the Navy inspector is paid less.
TABLE XXVII
NAVY RESPONSE TO NAVY CONSTRUCTION
REPRESENTATIVE SALARY
TOTAL
Contracts Less than $1 Million
ACTIVITY NO. RESP. HIGH ANSWER LOW ANSWER AVG. ANSWER
NAVFAC
CHESDIV 7 2000 1500 1750
NORTHDIV 24 1800 800 1489
LANTDIV 24 1800 975 1561
SOUTHDIV 25 1800 1000 1367
WESTDIV 25 2000 1200 1568
105 1512
Contracts from $1 to $5 Million
NAVFAC 1 1666
CHESDIV 8 2000 1500 1729
NORTHDIV 25 1800 1000 1570
LANTDIV 28 1800 975 1524
SOUTHDIV 30 2000 1020 1557
WESTDIV 28 2000 1250 1718
TOTAL 120 1602
Contracts Greater than $5 Million
NAVFAC 1 1666
CHESDIV 7 2000 1500 1779
NORTHDIV 25 1900 1200 1560
LANTDIV 24 2000 975 1465
SOUTHDIV 30 2000 1000 1750




27. Section C, Question 3 - What are the approximate
costs of administering a CQC contract?
Response to this question is shown in Table XXVIII,
since the number of Navy and contractor responses to this
question was small, no breakdown of EFD results is provided.
TABLE XXVIII
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF CQC CONTRACTING
CATEGORY NO. RES P. HIGH ANSWER LOW ANSWER AVG. ANSWER
Navy 40 $6300/mo. $150/mo. $2063/mo.
Contractors 27 $9000/mo. $250/mo. $3176/mo.
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28. Section C, Question 4 - What are the approximate
costs of administering a non-CQC contract?
Table XXIX displays the response to this question.
No EFD breakdown was provided. The average response of the
Navy and contractors was very close, differing by approxi-
mately $7 per month. It is in the comparison of Tables
XXVIII and XXIX that an interesting development occurred.
Both Navy and contractors agreed that a non-CQC contract
can be administered for less than a CQC contract. If the
CQC program were functioning properly, however, the costs
of administration should be less for CQC from both the Navy's
and contractor's perspectives since the Navy will not have
to provide total inspection, and since the contractor, by
performing his own quality control, will avoid many construc-
tion problems and delays. The perception, therefore, is that
CQC does not save administration costs from either the Navy's
or contractor's points of view.
Another interesting aspect of this question uncovered
by the survey is shown by comparing the difference in the
averages of the contractor's answers for the administration
of CQC and non-CQC contracts ($1836 per month) with the aver-
age of the CQC salary obtained from Table XXVI ($18 83) ; the
two numbers are almost exactly the same. The conclusion
could be drawn that the only additional aspect of Quality
Control performed by the contractor under CQC is the provision
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of the CQC representative. No additional administrative
costs are identified.
TABLE XXIX
ADMINISTRATION COSTS OF NON-CQC CONTRACTING
CATEGORY NO. RESP . HIGH ANSWER LOW ANSWER AVG. ANSWER
Navy 41 $8000/mo. $100/mo. $1414/mo.
Contractors 16 $4500/mo. $100/mo. $1340/mo.
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29. Section C, Question 5 - Does the IRS or other
Government agencies audit CQC contracts more often than
non-CQC ones?
Table XXX shows the results of the response to
this question. The majority of the Navy respondents (83%)
and the contractors (96%) believed that the CQC provision
does not result in a greater frequency of auditing by any
Government agency.
TABLE XXX
AUDITING BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
NUMBER NUMBER TOTAL
CATEGORY "YES" RESP. % CAT. "NO" RESP. % CAT. RESP. % TOTAL
Navy 11 17 55 83 66 73
Contractor s
_1 4 24 96 25 27
Total 12 13 79 87 91
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30. Section C, Question 6 - How much would a typical
bid price be reduced or increased if the CQC provision were
eliminated?
Tables XXXI and XXXII show the Navy and contractor
response to this question. Eighty-five percent (85%) of the
Navy respondents, and one hundred percent (100%) of the con-
tractors who provided answers in dollars agreed that, without
CQC, bid price would be reduced. Of those respondents who
provided answers in units other than dollars, twenty-seven
of twenty-nine Navy respondents, and seventeen of nineteen
contractors indicated a bid price reduction. Interestingly,
NAVFAC responded that no price reduction would occur.
TABLE XXXI
NAVY BID PRICE CHANGE ESTIMATE
HIGH LOW AVERAGE
CATEGORY NO. RESP. % TOTAL SELECTION SELECTION SELECTION
Bid reduction 35 85 $85,000 $5,000 $32,229
Bid increase
_6 15 $50,000 $23,000 $30,000
Total 41
TABLE XXXII
CONTRACTOR BID PRICE CHANGE ESTIMATE
HIGH LOW AVERAGE
CATEGORY NQ RESP. % TOTAL SELECTION SELECTION SELECTION
Bid reduction 10 100 $120,000 $3,500 $61,550
Bid increase




31. Section C, Item 7 - Please include any comments or
questions that you feel are essential to this research or
that are missing from this survey.
One of the most interesting aspects of this survey
was the degree of response encountered, not only in the high
percentage of questionnaire returns, but also in the surpris-
ing response to this particular portion of the questionnaire.
Fifty-six percent (56%) of all Navy respondents and fifty-
three percent (53%) of all contractor respondents included
comments in this segment of the questionnaire. These comments
ranged from a single sentence in some instances to full addi-
tional pages of opinions in others. To reproduce the comments
received would nearly double the content of this section.
Instead, written statements or opinions were divided into
three specific groups, each dealt with in a different manner
The first group, comments regarding specific issues
raised in other parts of the questionnaire, were used to
develop the analysis of respondent attitudes and opinions.
The second group, suggestions for improving or revising the
CQC process, are discussed in the following section of this
chapter. The third, general comments on the present status
of CQC, while offering little value technically, framed the
atmosphere under which the responses were given, and are
included herein. The following are a selectional cross-




CHESDIV AROICC - Generally the added costs involved with CQC
outweigh the benefits, which are slight.
NORTHDIV AREA COORDINATOR - CQC is the best alternative we
have to the problem of insufficient Government
inspectors due to ceilings, and is much cheaper
than Title II. If you get a good CQC plan and
make the contractor follow it, you will get good
quality. A record of removal of problem CQC
representatives helps establish credibility in
Navy enforcement.
NORTHDIV SUPERVISORY CIVIL ENGINEER - The only beneficial
factor of the CQC program is that the contractor
remains liable for his work, including faulty
work due to workmanship, materials, or wrongly
approved shop drawings irregardless of when the
error was discovered.
NORTHDIV CONSTRUCTION REPRESENTATIVE - If the Navy would
enforce the specs on CQC it would work great.
EFD BRANCH HEAD - As long as the Navy and other Government
agencies select contractors on the basis of low
bidder, a self-inspection system by the contrac-
tor (CQC) will never work.
LANTDIV CIVILIAN AROICC - The single advantage of CQC is that
anything missed during inspection can be blamed
on the CQC representative and not the Government
inspector. But a contractor is supposed to be
ultimately responsible for his work anyway.
LANTDIV CONSTRUCTION REPRESENTATIVE - Whenever I've encoun-
tered a really efficient, conscientious individual
serving as CQC, he has sought other employment
either for reasons of conscience or salary.
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SOUTHDIV AREA COORDINATOR - CQC can be a mixed bag. The
contractor who wants to make a mockery of it can
usually find a way; however, most take it fairly
seriously, and in those cases, I feel it is worth
the price I'm sure we pay for it.
SOUTHDIV ROICC - We must continually remind the CQC repre-
sentatives of their responsibilities. I'm sure
lots of items slip by because of the CQC concept.
SOUTHDIV SUPERVISORY CONSTRUCTION REPRESENTATIVE - The
Government inspector does not feel fully respon-
sible for CQC contracts, therefore, he does not
spend the time to study the contract requirements
in detail and may not be present at crucial times.
SOUTHDIV AROICC - A properly administered CQC contract can be
a great asset to both the contractor and the Navy.
There is no reason why a contractor will not
attempt to complete high quality work if he knows
there is an ultimate benefit to him.
SOUTHDIV ROICC - (The money saved on bid price) could be
better spent on Navy inspection of contractor
work. CQC with its inherent conflict of interest
does not work as intended. Good contractors will
do good work with or without CQC.
WESTDIV AROICC - Although I support the idea of a CQC program,
we have had rather mixed results with the system
and it is difficult to say whether CQC projects
turn out better than non-CQC. The overall success
of a project depends heavily on the quality of the
design; the contractor and Government personnel
involved, and other external factors really have
nothing to do with the CQC program per se.
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WESTDIV CONSTRUCTION REPRESENTATIVE - We do not give the CQC
man the backing he needs for him to do his job.
Too often he is threatened by the contractor with
firing if he does not agree with the project
superintendent. He should be protected from
harassment.
WESTDIV ROICC - We could double our' staff and eliminate CQC
with ease.
CHESDIV CQC REPRESENTATIVE - I feel CQC contracts should be
eliminated for several reasons. The money could
be better spent hiring more Navy inspectors to a
short-handed staff and get a better finished
product.
CHESDIV PROJECT MANAGER - Although our people are trained to
be quality oriented, we have found that many con-
tract requirements regarding quality and finish
can be interpreted in various ways. If the owner
is not represented at the site, significant addi-
tional costs could be encountered to redo work
within contract limits or the owner may have to
live with a product he doesn't really want.
NORTHDIV CONTRACTOR - The CQC ' s authority and control, intended
to be complete, is overruled and usurped by the
Navy, rendering the system wasteful and ineffective.
NORTHDIV PROJECT MANAGER - The CQC position is used by the
Navy representatives as a party to blame for all
problems arising on the job site, and as a way to
avoid involvement in any decision making.
LANTDIV CONSTRUCTION SUPERINTENDENT - The CQC representative
is generally experienced in one area of work,
whereas the Navy has various people experienced




SOUTHDIV PROJECT MANAGER - Having been a CQC , I was personally
benefitted very much; however, I don't feel that
there is anything I did for the job that wouldn't
have been done anyway.
WESTDIV CQC REPRESENTATIVE - The CQC program as set up, directly
adds to the contractor's costs. Quality control
is a must for all reputable contractors. It is
done with the production forces. The CQC program
introduces an additional monitoring force that
also is monitored by the Navy and the designer.
The intermediate step is ineffective, as the real
power to make changes where required and to see
that proper interpretations of the specifications
are made, must stay with the designer and the
owner.
C. ALTERNATIVE QUALITY PROGRAMS
No discussion of the CQC program could be complete without
an examination of alternate methods of Quality Control. How-
ever, rather than a broad examination of the wide range of
available Quality Control techniques, some of which would be
costly for the Navy to implement or impractical to enforce,
this discussion will be limited to less esoteric variations
on the present CQC theme.
Response to the survey questionnaire indicated that a
large portion of respondents were not satisfied with the re-
sults of the Navy's CQC program. Simultaneously, however,
many of the written responses indicated that the fault was
not in the CQC concept, but rather in the format of its pres-
entation. The theme of this section will therefore be not how
to replace CQC, but how to improve it.
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There were many suggestions from respondents on methods
to modify the CQC program in order to achieve better results.
Most of these suggestions were made in one of two categories:
suggestions for procedural or administrative changes, or sug-
gestions for changes in the philosophy of CQC. It is in
these two categories that the alternatives will be presented.
1. Internal/Administrative CQC Alternatives
a. Prominent Display of the CQC Requirement
Several contractors objected that, since the CQC
requirements were detailed in the contract General Provisions
and not in the Specifications, there was a tendency on the
part of many contractors to discount the importance of CQC.
A more-prominent entry in the beginning of the specifications
could alert the contractor that CQC will be used and enforced
in its entirety, and Section 7 6 of the General Provisions
could be attached to the bid package.
b. More-Detailed Screening of the CQC Candidate
Many Navy respondents suggested that a great deal
of trouble could be saved if the Navy would screen the CQC
nominees more closely and turn down candidates without suffi-
cient qualifications or experience. By putting the contractor
on notice that second-rate CQC personnel are not acceptable,




c. Educate the ROICC
The response to many of the questions of the
questionnaire indicated that many Navy personnel are not
aware of the limits of constructive action that could be
taken to make the CQC program work. EFD training sessions,
where ROICC personnel could learn CQC skills and share exper-
iences would broaden the education of the contract adminis-
trator and also promote more unified practical application of
CQC techniques.
d. Educate the Contractor
Another proposed method of improving the CQC
program was to convince the contractor that CQC would save
him money if properly administered. Many contractors sin-
cerely believe that the Navy instituted CQC for the sole
purpose of ensnaring the contractor in a web of paperwork.
An easy-to-understand booklet detailing the CQC process,
explaining its benefits, and even showing examples of prac-
tical application of good CQC techniques could be published
and distributed to present and potential CQC contractors.
This booklet could, in the long run, change many contractor
attitudes toward CQC.
e. Better Define the CQC Program
It was suggested that since many of the aspects
of CQC are objective in nature, interpretation disagreements
are inevitable. A comprehensive review of CQC with the goal
of establishing definite standards for quality should
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be accomplished. The more specific CQC is made, the fewer
the interpretive claims.
f. Let the Superintendent be the CQC
Many contractors argued that they had CQC in
effect without the CQC provision, but that it was included
in the duties of the production forces. One contractor claimed
that the Corps of Engineers allows the superintendent to func-
tion as the CQC on selected contracts. Letting the production
function control quality could work if the contractor were
totally serious about providing quality construction.
g. More Effective Design Review
Another tool available to the Navy that could have
a significant impact on the results of the CQC program is the
design review. The design review has been called by some to
be the most important tool for developing inherent quality or
reliability in a product [Ref . 19]
.
By setting standards for design quality and thor-
oughly reviewing all aspects of the plans and specifications,
it is possible to eliminate many potential problems before
the contract is let. To do this correctly, the Navy would
be required to invest a considerable amount of its EFD talent
into the formation and operation of design review teams.
These teams, composed of experts in each aspect of the project,
would review the potential contract in far more depth and
detail than is presently being accomplished. A review con-
ducted in this manner would not only clear up design problems
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before they became construction problems, but would also
alert the designers that the Navy is interested in complete,
quality designs.
2. External/Philosophical CQC Alternatives
a. Separate CQC from the Contractor
A great many Navy and contractor proposals called
for the total separation of the CQC function from the contrac-
tor, thereby eliminating any potential or actual conflict of
interest. Several methods were suggested for accomplishing
this segregation. The ROICC, not the contractor, could hire
the CQC representative, salaried by the contractor or by the
cost savings resulting from the elimination of the CQC from
the contractor's responsibilities. The contractor could hire
the CQC representative, but abdicate the privilege of firing
him or reducing his pay unless sufficient evidence existed
to document his deficiencies. The CQC representative could
also be hired by the Navy separate from both the contractor
and the ROICC, as an independent Quality Control expert.
b. Hire Another Agency as CQC
The CQC function could be contracted with an inde-
pendent agency or consulting firm. This firm could provide
Quality Control inspection on one or several jobs simultane-
ously. The advantages of this system would be consistent
quality standards as well as the cost savings resulting from




c. Increase Designer Responsibility
The largest single response in this category-
favored the designer taking an increased role in the construc-
tion process, including the CQC function. There are many
reasons why the designer is a logical choice to practice CQC;
primary among them is the fact that, of all parties in the
contract process, the designer has the best grasp of the re-
quirements of the customer and the intentions of the plans
and specifications.
To illustrate the incongruity of the present
system of designer involvement, it is only necessary to review
the Comptroller General's review, in July of 1977, of the
policy establishing designer responsibility for design defi-
ciencies. The report found that Government agencies were
ignoring the designer after the contract had been awarded,
even to the point of not pursuing the collection of additional
costs resulting from design errors and omissions.
Although the designer, with his knowledge of the
Navy's desires and the design criterion would seem a likely
candidate to provide Quality Control, there are several prob-
lems inherent to this change. The first is the fact that the
American Institute of Architects (AIA) , through its standards,
limit the designer's role in construction inspection, prohib-
iting exhaustive, or continuous on-site inspection. The
second factor is the fact that the designer, if knowing that
he will have control of job quality, may not sufficiently
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design the project before it is bid [Ref . 17] . By employing
the designer as the CQC force, the Navy may therefore end up




Table XXXIII provides a condensation of the data displayed
in Chapter III. The Navy and contractor response to each par-
ticular statement is denoted by either an "A" or a "D" depend-
ing on whether the majority response approved or disapproved
of the premise presented.
In addition to the majority response information, there
are three other features incorporated into Table XXXIII to
allow for easier analysis of the data. First, the response
columns, in addition to the Navy and contractor majority
response, also include a third column titled "Model." This
column reflects the anticipated view of the majority of CQC
participants in the situation where the CQC program was
functionally ideal. Evaluations in the Model column were
compared to those in the Navy and contractor columns to see
how well each agrees with the perfect case.
Second, five of the statements are marked by a double
asterisk (**) . These five statements, assessing the atti-
tudes of respondents to CQC interface, delays, finished pro-
duct, rework, and the preference for CQC construction, relate
most directly to the respondent's overall view of the success
of the CQC program, and have therefore been termed the "key"
statements of the questionnaire. Navy, contractor, and model
response on each of the key statements was compared.
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Finally, there are three statements that measure the
respondent's view of the contractor's integrity and talent.
These statements are noted by an asterisk (*) , and a compar-
ison of Navy, contractor, and model response on these con-
tractor skill statements was also performed.
The model answers agreed with the Navy response in only
seven (7) of twenty-one (21) cases (33%) . The model and the
contractor agreed eight times (38%). In only five cases,
(24%) did all three agree. Interestingly, the Navy and con-
tractor responses matched in sixteen (16) instances (76%)
.
Unanimous majority agreement existed on the statements
that the Navy should perform final inspections, that CQC
contracts do not experience more delays than non-CQC, that
the CQC plan is vital, and that Navy personnel understand
and do not overinspect CQC. Of the areas where agreement
was consensus, only the delay statement was designated as
a key issue.
Comparing the overall response on the key issues, it was
noted that while all three parties agreed on delays, Navy and
contractor response was identical on every other key issue.
This agreement indicates general opinion, contrary to the
model, that CQC does not provide a smooth Navy-contractor
interface, that CQC does not provide a better finished pro-
duct than non-CQC, that CQC contracts do not experience less
rework than non-CQC, and that most respondents do not prefer
CQC to non-CQC contracts.
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Navy and contractor responses on the three contractor
integrity statements were contradictory. Both contractors
and the model indicated that most contractors would provide
quality without the CQC program, that the CQC representative
is usually sufficiently qualified, and that the contractor
gives the CQC representative free rein in performing his
duties. Navy respondents exhibited disagreement with each
of these responses.
Another interesting aspect of the summary is the fact
that there were eleven (11) instances (50%) where the Navy
and contractor response matched in disagreement with the
model. In addition to the key statements previously dis-
cussed, this agreement indicated that the Navy should be
responsible for compliance and progress inspection, that CQC
has an inherent conflict of interest, that CQC contracts are
not better designed than non-CQC, that the qualifications of
the CQC representative should be spelled out more clearly,
that CQC does not reduce costs, and that the contractor would
not hire the CQC representative in a similar function if not
required to do so.
Considering the individual and summary response as a
whole, it is obvious that the Navy's CQC program has much
room for improvement. This view is demonstrated by the facts
that the response from the majority of Navy and contractor
personnel were contrary to the model in most instances, that
the majority of respondents indicated a preference for non-CQC
120

contracting/ and that response to many statements included
in both this research and the previous Dean survey indicated
a decline in the attitudes of respondents in general.
While the data appear on the surface to indict the CQC
program, this is not necessarily the case. A great many
public and private sources support the CQC concept, and as
has been shown previously, the general comments of many re-
spondents indicated that while there is dissatisfaction with
various specific aspects of the CQC program, the concept on
the whole is acceptable and even inevitable.
The Navy's future CQC role, therefore, should be one of
enlightenment and affirmative action. Enlightenment is essen-
tial since nothing is worse for the morale of a field office
employee or contractor than to find that problems encountered
on the lowest levels have been avoided or solved successfully
in other areas, and the techniques and information concerning
that success has not been circulated. Affirmative action is
necessary since any program that is important and involves
great numbers of people should not be considered or treated
to be static. Gradual, well-conceived, change should be an
integral part of the program's life cycle if it is to function
at peak efficiency.
The respondents to the questionnaire, through their re-
sponses, have indicated displeasure with the Navy's CQC
program. It is the task of the program managers in NAVFAC





COMPARISON OF THE MAJORITY RESPONSE OF NAVY AND CONTRACTORS
Statement Majority Response
Number Statement Summary Navy Contractor Model
Bl Responsibility for Compliance
Inspection
B2 Responsibility for Progress
Inspection
B3 Responsibility for Final
Inspection
B4a(*) Contractor would provide CQC
without CQC Program





B4c CQC Reduces Submittal Time ADA
B4d CQC Provides Flexibility ADA
B4e(**) CQC Experiences More Delays
than Nbn-CQC
B4f (**) CQC Provides Better Finished
Product than Non-CQC
B4g CQC has an Inherent Conflict
of Interest
B4h(*) CQC Representatives Usually
Qualified
B4i CQC Better Designed than
Non-CQC
B4j (*) Contractor Gives Free Rein to
CQC Representative







B41 Navy Personnel Understand CQC AAA
B4m Qualifications of CQC Repre-
sentative Needed
B4n(**) CQC has Less Rework than
Non-CQC
B4o Navy Overinspects CQC D D D
B4p(**) Respondent Prefers CQC to
Non-CQC
B4q CQC Reduces Costs D D A
D D A
D D A
B4r Contractor would Hire CQC
Representative in QC











1. What is your present job title?
ROICC AROICC INSPECTOR/CONST REP.
EFD AREA COORDINATOR CONTRACT SPECIALIST
CQC REP. CQC CONTRACTOR OTHER
2. What is your rank (military/civilian) or company position?
How many Contractor Quality Control (CQC) contracts have
you inspected, administered, or been awarded in the past
five years in the following ranges?
#_ EFD
Less than $1 million
$1 to $5 million
Greater than $5 million
How many non-CQC contracts have you inspected, administered,
or been awarded in the past five years in the same ranges?
£ EFD
Less than $1 million
$1 to $5 million
Greater than $5 million
5. In questions 4 and 5, note the Engineering Field Division
(EFD) with which you coordinated on these same contracts.
B. ATTITUDES
1. In general, who should be responsible for the inspection
of contract construction for compliance with plans and
specifications?
Navy Designer Contractor Other
In general, who should be responsible for the progress
inspection of contract construction?
Navy Designer Contractor Other
3. In general, who should be responsible for the final
(acceptance) inspection of contract construction?
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1. What is the approximate pay scale for a CQC Rep. assigned
to a contract in the following ranges?
Less than $1 million $ /mo.
$1 to $5 million $ /mo.
Greater than $5 million $ /mo.
2. What is the approximate pay scale for a Navy inspector
assigned to a contract in the following ranges?
Less than $1 million $ /mo.
$1 to $5 million $ /mo.
Greater than $5 million $ /mo.
3. What are the approximate costs of administering a CQC
contract (transportation, testing, correspondence, report
submission, etc.)?
$ /mo.
4. What are the approximate costs of administering a non-CQC
contract (see #3 above)
$ /mo
.
5. Does the IRS or other government agencies audit CQC
contracts more frequently than non-CQC?
Yes No
How much would a typical contract bid price be reduced
or increased if the CQC clause were eliminated?
Reduced by $
Increased by $
7. Please include here any comments or questions that you





A. THE WEIGHTING PROCESS
In order to provide data of most meaningful quality, all
survey responses have been weighted. The weighting process
was designed so that the answers made by an individual with
limited or no experience in CQC would not be given the same
credence as those from a more experienced individual. Weight-
ing was accomplished in several steps. First, the number of
non-CQC contracts listed by the respondent was multiplied by
one, two, or three, depending on the dollar value of the con-
tract, and the number of CQC contracts was multiplied by four,
five, or six in the same manner. The numbers obtained were
then added to determine a total score for each respondent.
Government surveys having a total score from to 100 were
assigned a weight of one, surveys from 101 to 300 a weight of
two, surveys from 301 to 700 a weight of three, and surveys
with scores greater than 700 were weighted four. Contractor
surveys were processed in the same manner except that scores
from to 50 were weighted one, 51 to 100 weighted two, and
greater than 100 weighted three. The weights obtained for
the responses of each respondent were used in the calculation




The selection of the proper weighting process was very
important to the outcome of the thesis. In cases where the
recommendations of research are based on a great amount of
data, a sensitivity analysis is recommended. Prior to the
accomplishment of the sensitivity analysis, guidelines were
selected under which the sensitivity of the data to changes
in the values of the selected weights could be examined.
These assumptions or guidelines were as follows:
1. Any weighting system selected should give a signifi
cant emphasis to respondents with extensive CQC experience.
2. Any weighting system selected should give greater
weight to contracts of greater value.
3. The system should provide a broad base of low-rated
responses combined with a proportionately smaller grouping
of higher-weighted responses.
4. The weighting system selected should be as uncompli-
cated as possible.
In order to verify the selection of the weighting process,
a sensitivity analysis was performed for each of the steps.
Prior to the selection of the multiplication factors, various
combinations of factors were applied to a typical set of
response data and the results observed. This process is
shown in Table XXXIV. Trials four and five of Table XXXIV
were eliminated since they gave too great an emphasis to CQC
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number three was selected since it gave the greater emphasis
to CQC experience (57%) , while at the same time not minimizing
the effect of non-CQC experience (43%) , and at the same time
was also the simplest of the processes to apply.
The selection of the weights themselves was next accom-
plished by varying the groupings of the weighted totals and
observing the change in the percentage of responses in each
new group. Table XXXV shows this process for Government
responses. Alternative three was selected since it applies
the greatest effect to the highest two groupings (14%) but
does not at the same time minimize the effect of the two
lowest groups (86%) . In addition, alternative three provided
the most uniform proportional difference between the group-
ings. Table XXXVI displays the contractor responses. In a
similar manner, alternative two was selected as the best
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